Dear Russell, your "urstuff" is a nice belief, like my "infinite complexity". I feel your remark is not contradictory to my viewing. - YET: I am still uncomfortable with 'ontology' what I imagine as the description of the "AS IS" state in a constantly changing world. Being vs. becoming, a snapshot. *Physical* IMO is our ever changing explanatory basis for the poorly understandable phenomena we conceive time after time and apply math (maybe more complex than Bruno's integer-based arithmetics?) for such explanations. So 'figment' for "matter" is weird, but maybe closer. And 'primitive' is our ever changing view's past. (I like the 'infinite hotel': you check in, pay your bill and check out into the next one). I think "urstuff" is more than primitive numbers. I never read explanation on how 'numbers' arose in primitive(?) circumstances, forming the "World".
I guess 'universal computation' means more to you than just number-churning. Putative is mental activity, - any - covering more domains of the 'infinite complexity' (pardon me for applying this term) than we (may?) know of. Remember: I do not intend to argue with you, you may disregard my remarks, however I will appreciate your opinion. John Mikes On Wed, Jul 25, 2012 at 2:37 AM, Russell Standish <[email protected]>wrote: > On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 02:41:29PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: > > On 7/22/2012 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > >Usually I restrict "substance" for physicalist primitive ontology, > > >like atoms, particles or strings, which does not exist primitively > > >in the comp theory, but should be derived (by the conclusion of > > >the UDA). > > (Sorry for replying to Stephen's post - I can't respond to Bruno's > directly because of his non-standard email client) > > Actually, this is a useful clarification, as it is a point that has > confused me. > > So paraphrasing in my words, what Bruno is saying is: > > "primitive" = ontological basis of reality ("urstuff" as I put it) > "matter" = atoms, particles, strings that appear in physical theory > > COMP entails matter is not primitive means that the physical things we > observe > (atoms, electrons etc) must be emergent phenomena from whatever the > urstuff really is. I have little problem with this statement, as it is > fairly clear that atoms are emergent constructs, and one suspects > things like electrons, or even strings might be too. Perhaps knots or > some other topological defects of space-time (which is itself an > emergent phenomenon of relationships between events). > > Of course, COMP includes the arithmetic realism proposition. Bruno > claims this is just a statment of the truth of arithmetical statement > independent of what you or I think, ie that it is not an ontological > commitment. > > But another way of saying it is that it _is_ an ontological > commitment. The urstuff is the natural numbers. > > In fact I think COMP is saying something rather more important. It > doesn't matter what the urstuff is, so long as it supports universal > computation. Physical phenomena must be derivable from the first > person account, and it is useless to speculate on the nature of > urstuff beyond its capability to support universal computation. > > Thinking about David Deutsch's point further, and the observation that > we don't see hypercomputation like the infinity hotel, we can say what > the urstuff is not - it is not a hypercomputer like the infinity > hotel, for instance, but we can't say which of the many equivalent > structures supporting universal computation it is. > > -- > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
