Dear Russell,
your "urstuff" is a nice belief, like my "infinite complexity".
I feel your remark is not contradictory to my viewing.  - YET:
I am still uncomfortable with 'ontology' what I imagine as the description
of the "AS IS" state in a constantly changing world. Being vs. becoming, a
snapshot.
*Physical* IMO is our ever changing explanatory basis for the poorly
understandable phenomena we conceive time after time and apply math (maybe
more complex than Bruno's integer-based arithmetics?) for such
explanations.
So 'figment' for "matter" is weird, but maybe closer. And 'primitive' is
our ever changing view's past.
(I like the 'infinite hotel': you check in, pay your bill and check out
into the next one).
I think "urstuff" is more than primitive numbers. I never read explanation
on how 'numbers' arose in primitive(?) circumstances, forming the "World".

I guess 'universal computation' means more to you than just
number-churning. Putative is mental activity, - any - covering more domains
of the 'infinite complexity' (pardon me for applying this term) than we
(may?) know of.

Remember: I do not intend to argue with you, you may disregard my remarks,
however I will appreciate your opinion.

John Mikes
On Wed, Jul 25, 2012 at 2:37 AM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>wrote:

> On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 02:41:29PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> > On 7/22/2012 7:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >
> > >Usually I restrict "substance" for physicalist primitive ontology,
> > >like atoms, particles or strings, which does not exist primitively
> > >in the comp theory, but should be derived (by the conclusion of
> > >the UDA).
>
> (Sorry for replying to Stephen's post - I can't respond to Bruno's
> directly because of his non-standard email client)
>
> Actually, this is a useful clarification, as it is a point that has
> confused me.
>
> So paraphrasing in my words, what Bruno is saying is:
>
> "primitive" = ontological basis of reality ("urstuff" as I put it)
> "matter" = atoms, particles, strings that appear in physical theory
>
> COMP entails matter is not primitive means that the physical things we
> observe
> (atoms, electrons etc) must be emergent phenomena from whatever the
> urstuff really is. I have little problem with this statement, as it is
> fairly clear that atoms are emergent constructs, and one suspects
> things like electrons, or even strings might be too. Perhaps knots or
> some other topological defects of space-time (which is itself an
> emergent phenomenon of relationships between events).
>
> Of course, COMP includes the arithmetic realism proposition. Bruno
> claims this is just a statment of the truth of arithmetical statement
> independent of what you or I think, ie that it is not an ontological
> commitment.
>
> But another way of saying it is that it _is_ an ontological
> commitment. The urstuff is the natural numbers.
>
> In fact I think COMP is saying something rather more important. It
> doesn't matter what the urstuff is, so long as it supports universal
> computation. Physical phenomena must be derivable from the first
> person account, and it is useless to speculate on the nature of
> urstuff beyond its capability to support universal computation.
>
> Thinking about David Deutsch's point further, and the observation that
> we don't see hypercomputation like the infinity hotel, we can say what
> the urstuff is not - it is not a hypercomputer like the infinity
> hotel, for instance, but we can't say which of the many equivalent
> structures supporting universal computation it is.
>
> --
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
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