Hi Bruno Marchal Computers can only deal with what can be put into words, ie what can be discussed and shared. Consciousness or awareness is a wordless experience.
There is a huge gulf between what we experience and what we say we experience. The former is wordless, personal, private and subjective, the latter is is in language--shareable, public (experience converted into words and thus communicated) and objective version. Thus there are the natural, unbreakable dualisms: subjective objective experience spoken experience wordless in words private public personal shared faith belief etc. Poets and novelists are good at converting experiences (what one can imagine) into words. Most of us are not that good. Computers can only "think" in words so cannot experience anything. They thus can thus not be conscious. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/12/2012 ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 11:42:35 Subject: Re: God has no name On 10 Aug 2012, at 18:45, Brian Tenneson wrote: Yeah but you can't define what a set is either, so... The difference, but is there really one?, is that we the notion of set we can agree on axioms and rules, so that we can discuss independently on the metaphysical baggage, as you pointed out once. This can be done both formally, in which case what we really do is an interview of a machine that we trust, or informally, betting on the human willingness to reason. For example, with sets, we can agree on the fact that they are identified by their elements: the extensionality axiom: For all x, y, z, if (x belongs to y <-> x belongs to z) then y = z. We might prefer to work in an intensional set theory, where a set is defined by their means of construct, and which is more relevant for the study of machines and processes. But then we do lambda calculus or elementary topoi, or we work in a variety of combinatory algebra. But it will not be a disagreement, as we know there can be different notion of set, and so different tools. Likewise with consciousness. We might not been able to define it, but we can agree on principle on it, notably that, assuming comp, it is invariant for a set of computable transformations, like the lower level substitutions, and reason from that. We can agree that if X is conscious, then X cannot justify that through words. Likewise with God. An informal definition could be that God is Reality, not necessarily as we observe or experience it but as it is. We can only hope or bet for such a thing. It might be a physical universe, or it might be a mathematical universe, or an arithmetical universe, but with comp it is a "theological universe" in the sense that comp separates clearly the communicable and the non communicable part of that reality, if it exists. Life and creativity develop on that frontier, as it develops also in between equilibrium and non equilibrium, between computable and non computable, between controllable and non controllable, etc. And we can agree on axioms on "GOD", that is "REALITY" or "TRUTH". For example that it is unique, that we can search on it, that it is not definable, so that such words are really only meta pointer to it, etc. The advantage of the definition of GOD by REALITY, or GOD = TRUTH, is that no honest believers, in any confessions, should have a problem with it, and for the atheists or the materialist GOD becomes a material physical universe a bit like 0, 1, and 2 became number when 'number' meant first 'numerous'. Mathematicians always does that trick, to extend the definition of a concept so that we simplify the key general statements. Is GOD a person? That might be an open problem for some, and an open problem for others. Truth might be subtile: in NeoPlatonism GOD (the ONE) is not a person, nor a creator, but from it emanates two other GODS (in the ancient greek sense, Plotinus call them hypostases) the third one being a person (the universal soul). For all matter, we need only to agree on semi-axiomatic definition, the rest is (a bit boring imo) vocabulary discussions. It hides the real conceptual differences in the attempt to apprehend what is, or could be. Bruno On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 2:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: Hi Roger, On 07 Aug 2012, at 11:53, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal OUR FATHER, WHICH ART IN HEAVBEN, HALLOWED BE THY NAME. Luther said that to meditate of the sacredness of God according to this phrase is the oldest prayer. In old testament times, God's name was considered too sacred to speak by the Jews. The King James Bible uses YHWH, the Jews never say "God" as far as I know, they sometimes write it as G*d. We have relaxed these constrictions in the protestant tradition, use Jehovah and all sorts of other sacfed names. It is the problem with the notions of God, Whole, Truth, consciousness, etc. we can't define them. You can sum up Damascius by "one sentence on the ineffable is already one sentence too much, it can only miss the point". (But Damascius wrote thousand of pages on this!). Like Lao Tseu said that the genuine wise man is mute, also. John Clark said it recently too! This is actually well explained (which does not mean that the explanation is correct) by computer science: a universal machine can look inward and prove things about itself, including that there are true proposition that she cannot prove as far as she is consistent, that machine-truth is not expressible, etc. My last paper (in french) is entitled "la machine mystique" (the mystical machine) and concerns all the things that a machine might know without being able to justify it rationally and which might be counter-intuitive from her own point of view. The word "god" is not problematical ... as long as we don't take the word too much seriously. You can say "I search God", but you can't say "I found God", and still less things like "God told me to tell you to send me money or you will go to hell". God is more a project or a hope for an explanation. It cannot be an explanation itself. For a scientist: it is more a problem than a solution, like consciousness, for example. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/7/2012 Is life a cause/effect activity ? If so, what is the cause agent ? ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-07, 05:37:56 Subject: Re: God has no name Hi Stephen, On 8/6/2012 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Which is the definition I use. Any one that actually thinks that God is a person, could be a person, or is the complement (anti) of such, has truly not thought through the implications of such. [BM For me, and comp, it is an open problem. [SPK] ? Why? It's not complicated! A person must be, at least, nameable. A person has always has a name. [BM] Why? Because names are necessary for persistent distinguishability. OK. You are using "name" in the logician sense of "definite description". With comp we always have a 3-name, but the first person have no name. Let us try an informal proof by contradiction. Consider the case where it is *not* necessary for a person to have a name. What means would then exist for one entity to be distinguished from another? By the entity itself: no problem (and so this is not a problem for the personal evaluation of the measure). By some other entity? We might consider the location of an entity as a proxy for the purposes of identification, but this will not work because entities can change location and a list of all of the past locations of an entity would constitute a name and such is not allowed in our consideration here. Sure. What about the 1p content of an entity, i.e. the private name that an entity has for itself with in its self-referential beliefs? It has no such name. "Bp & p", for example, cannot be described in arithmetic, despite being defined in arithmetical terms. It is like arithmetical truth, we can't define it in arithmetic language. Since it is not communicable - as this would make the 1p aspect a non-first person concern and thus make it vanish - it cannot be a name. Names are 3p, they are public invariants that form from a consensus of many entities coming to an agreement, and thus cannot be determined strictly by 1p content. You might also note that the anti-foundation axiom is "every graph has a unique decoration". The decoration is the name! It is the name that allow for non-ambiguous identification. A number's name is its meaning invariant symbol representation class... Consider what would happen to COMP if entities had no names! Do I need to go any further for you to see the absurdity of persons (or semi-autonomous entities) not having names? Say that it is X. There is something that is not that person and that something must therefore have a different name: not-X. What is God's name? ... It cannot be named because there is nothing that it is not! Therefore God cannot be a person. Transcendence eliminates nameability. The Abrahamist think that Satan is the anti-God, but that would be a denial of God's transcendence. There are reasons why Abrahamists do not tolerate logic, this is one of them. With comp if God exists it has no name, but I don't see why it would make it a non person. God is unique, it does not need a name. God is unique because there is no complement nor alternative to it. Ambiguously stated: God is the totality of what is necessarily possible. That is not bad in a first approximation. With comp, you can make it precise through the set of G?el numbers of the true arithmetical sentences. Obviously this is not a computable set, and it is not nameable by the machine (with comp), making set theory somehow too rich for comp. Of course, arithmetic contains or emulates a lot of entities believing in set theory, but we should not reify those beliefs in the ontology. It is better to keep them only in the machine epistemology. On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Is the translation or encoding a unique mapping? How many possible ways are available to encode B? There is an infinity of way to encode "B". Some can be just intensionally equivalent (different codes but same logic), or extensionally equivalent but not intensionally equivalent, like Bp and Bp & Dt. They prove the same arithmetical proposition, but obeys different logic. OK, do you not see that the infinity of ways that "B" can be encoded makes the name of "B" ambiguous? I don't see that at all. The name of "B" is at most 1p; a private name and thus subject to Wittgenstein's criticism. All the names of "B" are third person notion, even if "B" itself cannot recognize its body or code. It is only "self-ambiguous", which is partially relevant for the measure problem. This is why I use modal logic to handle that situation, besides the fact that incompleteness leaves no real choice in the matter. The experiences are strictly 1p even if they are the intersection of an infinity of computations, but this is what makes then have a zero measure! Ah? A finite and semi-closed consensus of 1p's allows for the construction of diaries and thus for the meaningfulness of "shared" experiences. But this is exactly what a non-primitive material world is in my thinking and nothing more. A material world is merely a synchronized collection of interfaces (aka synchronized or 'aligned' bisimulations) between the experiences of the computations. I use the concept of simulations (as discussed by David Deutsch in his book "The Fabric of Reality") to quantify the experiences of computations. You use the modal logical equivalent. I think that we are only having a semantical disagreement here. ? The problem that I see in COMP is that if we make numbers (or any other named yet irreducible entity) as an ontological primitive makes the measure problem unsolvable because it is not possible to uniquely name relational schemata of numbers. The anti-foundation axiom of Azcel - every graph has a unique decoration - is not possible in your scheme because of the ambiguity of naming that Godel numbering causes. One always has to jump to a meta-theory to uniquely name the entities within a given theory (defined as in Godel's scheme) such that there is a bivalent truth value for the names. Interestingly, this action looks almost exactly like what happens in a forcing! So my claim is, now, that at best your step 8 is true in a forced extension. 1004. On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] At what level (relative) is the material hypostases? [BM] This is ambiguous. The material hypostases (Bp & Dt) defines the (high) level where machines (the person incarnated by the machine) can make the observations. But it is preferable to extracts all those answer by yourself, for all what I say here needs to be extracted to get the UDA step by step. Dear Bruno, OK, we seem to be in agreement on this. At the "high level" there is a meaningful notion of observations (and naming as I have discussed in previous posts) but never at the primitive level. OK. My point is that this meaningfulness vanished anywhere outside of this high level. I agree. We cannot pull back the meaning of a term when and if we pull back the term to the primitive level, because doing so, as you discuss in step 8, ? severs the connection that carries the relations that define the unique name that occurs at the high level. This is the problem of epiphenomena of immaterialism. ? On 8/6/2012 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: We cannot use the Godel numbering because they are not unique, ? If the names (description) were unique, there would be no first person indeterminacy. A enumerable infinity , non mechanically enumerable though, of explicit description of Stephen King exists in arithmetic, if comp is true. Dear Bruno, But it does not exist uniquely as a singleton in arithmetic OK. and that is the problem. The interesting problem, yes. That is the point. It does exist as the equivalence relation on a infinite class of computations, but these equivalence classes do not have a power-set of which they are a uniquely defined. ? Names are only meaningful when and if they are 3p. Sure. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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