On 15 Aug 2012, at 21:09, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/15/2012 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. The ontological primary medium is given by any universal
system. I have chosen arithmetic to fix the thing.
OK, you chose arithmetic. But my claim is that is only one of an
infinite number of possible primitives that can act as labels of
partitioned pieces of the medium, stated crudely.
That is what I was saying. But they are all equivalent. The physics
derived from any of them will be the same. Same for the theology.
One must assume a mereology (whole-part relational scheme) in any
ontological theory or else there is no way to explain or communicate
it or about it.
That is exactly what I told you. Any universal system has a mereology.
But your existence theory has not, as you disallow properties for your
"neutral" existence. So you are making my point here. Numbers have a
rich mereology, actually infinitely many.
This is exactly why I argue that a physical world (that is a
common delusion of a mutually non-contradictory collection of
1p's) is and must be considered to be on the same ontological
plane as the combinators.
That does not make any sense to me.
The components (parts) have to be distinguished from each other
and the whole. Combinators or any other valuation acts as a means to
label the parts so that they are different from each other.
Components of what? Which whole? This is unclear.
Since the physical worlds cannot be considered to be
ontologically primitive (since they require the UD*) then neither
can the combinators, as they have no distinguishably (or
availability for truth valuations), be considered to be
ontologically primitive.
If you don't have them, you can't build them. I will use the
abbreviation 'numbers for numbers OR combinators or Fortran program
or lambda terms or game of life pattern or ...
Yes, and this is exactly my point! There is no unique canonical
labeling set of entities. There is (at least!) an uncountable
infinite equivalence class of them. Labels and valuations cannot be
considered as separable from the entities that they act on as
valuation. Therefore we cannot think of them as uniquely
ontologically primitive.
? Proof?
What I say is that without 'numbers, you will never have 'numbers.
We cannot define 'numbers from less.
I do not dispute that. The numbers must be irreducible, or
"simple" in Leibniz' definition. But their particular value is not
inherent in them such that the can be considered to have a
particular set of properties when considered in isolation from all
else. The value of 1 or 2 or 3 or ... is derived uniquely from its
relations to all other numbers that are in its class. A 1 does not
have inherent value outside of that relational scheme.
Unclear, and the relevance is unclear too. It looks again like you are
arguing against any theory.
Both have to be considered as existing on the same ontological
level. Your proposition that we can have a consistent immaterial
basis for all existence is simply inconsistent and thus wrong.
You have to show the inconsistency.
I am doing exactly that. I am trying to explain why
immaterialism fails
This contradict the small amount of what I thought to understand from
your "theory".
and thus why it cannot be considered to be a coherent ontological
theory. In fact the entire class of immaterial ontology theories
fails on this: the induced epiphenomena of physical objects and the
physical world. Your statement that COMP reduces the mind-body
problem to just a body problem *is* the fatal flaw.
It is the last sentence of a proof. To say that a formula is flawed
does not work in science. You must find the guilty error leading to
that formula.
If not we are doing philosophy, and this is very confusing when doing
science on traditional philosophical notions.
It simply cannot explain interactions between bodies.
That is not relevant in the UDA proofs. If you are right, then there
is an 9th step in UDA, and UDA1-9 would prove that comp wrong. But
then write that 9th step.
Additionally it ahs severe problem explaining the necessity of the
appearance of change that we experience.
It has a billion more problems. The point is that such problems are
entirely transformed into arithmetical formula.
Does the subset have to be representable as a Boolean algebra?
[BM]
This is ambiguous. I would say "yes" if by subset you mean the
initial segment of UD*.
We can only make a claim that the sentence that is making that
claim is true if and only if that subset can be identified in
contradistinction with the rest of the UD*. This is equivalent to
locating a single number within an infinite class of numbers.
Given that it is a fact that the integers have a measure of zero
in 2^aleph_0,
There is no additive measure. If you are using a non additive
measure, then it depends on the choice of the measure, there are
many. Anyway, comp makes the measure problem bearing on infinite
computations, some including oracles, not the numbers.
What difference do oracles make? So we might consider logical
schemata that imply "betting" and/or "guessing" behavior. They still
have a problem because there is no global relation on them that
orders their outcomes. What you have discussed so far in your work
is just accidentalism in a logical jargon. What I am advocating does
not postulate that "everything occurs or results from a definite
cause" in a global sense nor deny such. It implies that such
questions are actually meaningless. Only local and finite and
Boolean relata have the necessary aspects to define "causes" and
thus solve the interaction problem.
If you would only consider the concurrency problem directly you
might understand this for yourself.
We have discuss this a tun of times. See my preview answer. Also this
paragraph does not answer the point I made.
then it follows that the initial segment of the UD* has a measure
of zero as well. A measure simply does not exist that would select
the correct segment and thus we cannot make that claim. It is only
as you wrote initially, "this is ambiguous". An ambiguous sentence
is not the same as a true (or false!) statement. My claim is that
the Boolean Representation criterion is true if and only if there
exist a physical implementation of the segment of the UD*.
Define physical implementation in your theory (or idea).
This email is an example.
An example is not a definition.
The fact that you are capable of reading it and comprehending
something that was only in my 1p prior to your act of reading this
sentence. The "fact" of it is only possible if there is a bivalent
(yes or no) valuation that can be unambiguously recovered.
And?
A physical state might be one that maximally exists
[BM]
... from the local first person points of view, of those dropping
the apple and trying to predict what they will feel. But there is
no physical state, only physical experience, which are not
definable in any third person point of view. A physical state,
with comp, is not an object.
There is no 3p unless there is a Boolean Representation
[BM]
This not logically valid, although I agree, with the usual
classical comp.
Could you explain your remark here?
I have no problem when classical logic is restricted to numbers or
programs, machines. But UDA works also in intuitionist logic.
Classical logic is just simpler, and more known.
How could there be an arbitrarily expandable representation that can
communicate a meaningful message between an arbitrarily large
collection of entities otherwise? Noise does not communicate
anything other than the presence or non-presence of noise.
?
and there cannot be a Boolean Representation without a collection
of mutually non-contradictory 1p observations.
[BM]
Now, that is idealism. With comp that is true for the physical
reality, not for the arithmetical one, which we postulate.
How? Could you elaborate?
Read sane04. It is elaborated there, concisely but completely. I was
just alluding to that proof.
The 1p indeterminacy must have "room" to put all of the copies out
first and then compared to each other (solving the NP-Complete
problem)
I just feel compassionate for your misleading obsession on NP.
This is because you are completely ignoring the concurrency
problem!
I don't ignore it.
You do not have an explanation of interactions in COMP
I have only the quantum logic. This does not change the vaility of the
reasoning. You reason like that, Darwin theory fail to predict the
mass of the boson, and string theory ignore the problem of how doing a
tasting pizza, so those theories are flawed. Comp explains already the
quanta and the qualia, but not yet time, space, real numbers, nor
pizza and boson. Works for next generations.
as proven by your discussion of the "body problem". It is in
considerations of the "body problem" that what I am explaining to
you (seemingly in an obsessive fashion!) becomes obvious.
I formulate a problem, and I have solved a tiny part of it. More to
illustrate how to proceed than to pretend having solve everything. I
agree with the problems you are mentioning. I disagree that such
problem refute UDA, as they have just no relevance at all.
and then and only then can we say that there is a true sentence.
Truth is not something that we can access without work. Work is a
physical action.
This is physicalism. I don't believe nor disbelieve it at the onset.
Please be elaborate on how this is the case. There are many
forms of physicalism, most of which I disagree with.
Comp shows that physics have to be retrieved from addition and
multiplication, unlike geography.
Physics is a branch of machine's theology, which does not postulate a
physical primitive reality.
You must grasp this by yourself, but you seem unable to read the paper
and ask question. You keep doing philosophy, which is not a problem,
except that you pretend that there is a flaw in a reasoning, but then
you must use your philosophy to find the flaw, not just assert its
existence.
in universal numbers, but this does not really answer anything.
[BM]
Indeed, it is *the* problem, which comp formulate mathematically
(even arithmetically).
I am not the person that knows or even has the capacity to
write this up in a formal way, but I do understand it.
Then you have to succeed in explaining your point informally, but
sufficiently clearly so that some one with that capacity can work
this out.
Good!
Mathematical objects are not "symbols" in my mind, they are
objects that I can "feel".
Good.
This is the curse and the blessing of dyslexia.
The body problem is still open.
[BM]
But a big part is solved.
Yes, but what I am telling you is that all of it can be solved
by using Pratt's methodology!
I doubt this as it address only a small part of it, and does not
take the first indeterminacy into account, nor comp actually.
It is not necessary to explicitly consider 1p indeterminacy or
COMP in Pratt's methodology as it assumes the consequences with the
exception of the argument for immaterialism.
I don't see that at all.
But the body problem vanishes if we follow Pratt's prescription!
[BM]
Explain how you derive F= ma in Pratt. I don't see any shadow of
this, nor even an awareness that to solve the body problem in
that setting. Pratt shows something interesting, not that the
body problem has vanished. Or write a paper showing this. None of
the ten problem on consciousness exposed in Michael Tye book are
even addressed, not to mention the body problem itself.
I understand your complaint, but you realize that you are
saying that because no one has written up a paper that you can
read that 'shows a derivation of F=ma' that there is no solution.
[BM]
Feynman derived it from the MW (to be short). And the MW is a
consequence of comp (to be short). Comp can explain F=ma, except
that it can, still not explain the x and t in a = d^2x/dt^2. With
comp, the weird become obvious, and the obvious becomes hard, like
the role of the variable x and t. But that is the point.
The x and the t are defined by the topological spaces (and
functions on and in them) that are the Stone dual to the logical
algebras! Can you not see this???? All of this starts with a Neutral
monist ontology and the idea of dual aspect dualism emanating from
the neutral ground. Numbers and all other abstracts on one side and
physical entities and so forth on the other.
1004 fallacy.
By making physical events and abstract/mental/immaterial states
the Stone dual of each other, neither is primitive in the
absolute sense. They both emerge from the underlying primitive
[]<>.
[BM]
With which "[]<>"?
You know what I mean, my existence theory. Existence is that
which is necessarily possible, the sum of all that exists.
That does not help. Sorry.
You are simply being incorrigible and stubborn.
Case closed.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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