On 15 Aug 2012, at 21:09, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/15/2012 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. The ontological primary medium is given by any universal system. I have chosen arithmetic to fix the thing.

OK, you chose arithmetic. But my claim is that is only one of an infinite number of possible primitives that can act as labels of partitioned pieces of the medium, stated crudely.

That is what I was saying. But they are all equivalent. The physics derived from any of them will be the same. Same for the theology.

One must assume a mereology (whole-part relational scheme) in any ontological theory or else there is no way to explain or communicate it or about it.

That is exactly what I told you. Any universal system has a mereology. But your existence theory has not, as you disallow properties for your "neutral" existence. So you are making my point here. Numbers have a rich mereology, actually infinitely many.

This is exactly why I argue that a physical world (that is a common delusion of a mutually non-contradictory collection of 1p's) is and must be considered to be on the same ontological plane as the combinators.

That does not make any sense to me.

The components (parts) have to be distinguished from each other and the whole. Combinators or any other valuation acts as a means to label the parts so that they are different from each other.

Components of what? Which whole? This is unclear.

Since the physical worlds cannot be considered to be ontologically primitive (since they require the UD*) then neither can the combinators, as they have no distinguishably (or availability for truth valuations), be considered to be ontologically primitive.

If you don't have them, you can't build them. I will use the abbreviation 'numbers for numbers OR combinators or Fortran program or lambda terms or game of life pattern or ...

Yes, and this is exactly my point! There is no unique canonical labeling set of entities. There is (at least!) an uncountable infinite equivalence class of them. Labels and valuations cannot be considered as separable from the entities that they act on as valuation. Therefore we cannot think of them as uniquely ontologically primitive.

? Proof?

What I say is that without 'numbers, you will never have 'numbers. We cannot define 'numbers from less.

I do not dispute that. The numbers must be irreducible, or "simple" in Leibniz' definition. But their particular value is not inherent in them such that the can be considered to have a particular set of properties when considered in isolation from all else. The value of 1 or 2 or 3 or ... is derived uniquely from its relations to all other numbers that are in its class. A 1 does not have inherent value outside of that relational scheme.

Unclear, and the relevance is unclear too. It looks again like you are arguing against any theory.

Both have to be considered as existing on the same ontological level. Your proposition that we can have a consistent immaterial basis for all existence is simply inconsistent and thus wrong.

You have to show the inconsistency.

I am doing exactly that. I am trying to explain why immaterialism fails

This contradict the small amount of what I thought to understand from your "theory".

and thus why it cannot be considered to be a coherent ontological theory. In fact the entire class of immaterial ontology theories fails on this: the induced epiphenomena of physical objects and the physical world. Your statement that COMP reduces the mind-body problem to just a body problem *is* the fatal flaw.

It is the last sentence of a proof. To say that a formula is flawed does not work in science. You must find the guilty error leading to that formula. If not we are doing philosophy, and this is very confusing when doing science on traditional philosophical notions.

It simply cannot explain interactions between bodies.

That is not relevant in the UDA proofs. If you are right, then there is an 9th step in UDA, and UDA1-9 would prove that comp wrong. But then write that 9th step.

Additionally it ahs severe problem explaining the necessity of the appearance of change that we experience.

It has a billion more problems. The point is that such problems are entirely transformed into arithmetical formula.

Does the subset have to be representable as a Boolean algebra?
This is ambiguous. I would say "yes" if by subset you mean the initial segment of UD*.

We can only make a claim that the sentence that is making that claim is true if and only if that subset can be identified in contradistinction with the rest of the UD*. This is equivalent to locating a single number within an infinite class of numbers. Given that it is a fact that the integers have a measure of zero in 2^aleph_0,

There is no additive measure. If you are using a non additive measure, then it depends on the choice of the measure, there are many. Anyway, comp makes the measure problem bearing on infinite computations, some including oracles, not the numbers.

What difference do oracles make? So we might consider logical schemata that imply "betting" and/or "guessing" behavior. They still have a problem because there is no global relation on them that orders their outcomes. What you have discussed so far in your work is just accidentalism in a logical jargon. What I am advocating does not postulate that "everything occurs or results from a definite cause" in a global sense nor deny such. It implies that such questions are actually meaningless. Only local and finite and Boolean relata have the necessary aspects to define "causes" and thus solve the interaction problem. If you would only consider the concurrency problem directly you might understand this for yourself.

We have discuss this a tun of times. See my preview answer. Also this paragraph does not answer the point I made.

then it follows that the initial segment of the UD* has a measure of zero as well. A measure simply does not exist that would select the correct segment and thus we cannot make that claim. It is only as you wrote initially, "this is ambiguous". An ambiguous sentence is not the same as a true (or false!) statement. My claim is that the Boolean Representation criterion is true if and only if there exist a physical implementation of the segment of the UD*.

Define physical implementation in your theory (or idea).

    This email is an example.

An example is not a definition.

The fact that you are capable of reading it and comprehending something that was only in my 1p prior to your act of reading this sentence. The "fact" of it is only possible if there is a bivalent (yes or no) valuation that can be unambiguously recovered.


A physical state might be one that maximally exists
... from the local first person points of view, of those dropping the apple and trying to predict what they will feel. But there is no physical state, only physical experience, which are not definable in any third person point of view. A physical state, with comp, is not an object.

    There is no 3p unless there is a Boolean Representation
This not logically valid, although I agree, with the usual classical comp.

    Could you explain your remark here?

I have no problem when classical logic is restricted to numbers or programs, machines. But UDA works also in intuitionist logic. Classical logic is just simpler, and more known.

How could there be an arbitrarily expandable representation that can communicate a meaningful message between an arbitrarily large collection of entities otherwise? Noise does not communicate anything other than the presence or non-presence of noise.


and there cannot be a Boolean Representation without a collection of mutually non-contradictory 1p observations.
Now, that is idealism. With comp that is true for the physical reality, not for the arithmetical one, which we postulate.

    How? Could you elaborate?

Read sane04. It is elaborated there, concisely but completely. I was just alluding to that proof.

The 1p indeterminacy must have "room" to put all of the copies out first and then compared to each other (solving the NP-Complete problem)

I just feel compassionate for your misleading obsession on NP.

This is because you are completely ignoring the concurrency problem!

I don't ignore it.

You do not have an explanation of interactions in COMP

I have only the quantum logic. This does not change the vaility of the reasoning. You reason like that, Darwin theory fail to predict the mass of the boson, and string theory ignore the problem of how doing a tasting pizza, so those theories are flawed. Comp explains already the quanta and the qualia, but not yet time, space, real numbers, nor pizza and boson. Works for next generations.

as proven by your discussion of the "body problem". It is in considerations of the "body problem" that what I am explaining to you (seemingly in an obsessive fashion!) becomes obvious.

I formulate a problem, and I have solved a tiny part of it. More to illustrate how to proceed than to pretend having solve everything. I agree with the problems you are mentioning. I disagree that such problem refute UDA, as they have just no relevance at all.

and then and only then can we say that there is a true sentence. Truth is not something that we can access without work. Work is a physical action.

This is physicalism. I don't believe nor disbelieve it at the onset.

Please be elaborate on how this is the case. There are many forms of physicalism, most of which I disagree with.

Comp shows that physics have to be retrieved from addition and multiplication, unlike geography. Physics is a branch of machine's theology, which does not postulate a physical primitive reality. You must grasp this by yourself, but you seem unable to read the paper and ask question. You keep doing philosophy, which is not a problem, except that you pretend that there is a flaw in a reasoning, but then you must use your philosophy to find the flaw, not just assert its existence.

in universal numbers, but this does not really answer anything.
Indeed, it is *the* problem, which comp formulate mathematically (even arithmetically).

I am not the person that knows or even has the capacity to write this up in a formal way, but I do understand it.

Then you have to succeed in explaining your point informally, but sufficiently clearly so that some one with that capacity can work this out.


Mathematical objects are not "symbols" in my mind, they are objects that I can "feel".


This is the curse and the blessing of dyslexia.

The body problem is still open.
But a big part is solved.

Yes, but what I am telling you is that all of it can be solved by using Pratt's methodology!

I doubt this as it address only a small part of it, and does not take the first indeterminacy into account, nor comp actually.

It is not necessary to explicitly consider 1p indeterminacy or COMP in Pratt's methodology as it assumes the consequences with the exception of the argument for immaterialism.

I don't see that at all.

But the body problem vanishes if we follow Pratt's prescription!
Explain how you derive F= ma in Pratt. I don't see any shadow of this, nor even an awareness that to solve the body problem in that setting. Pratt shows something interesting, not that the body problem has vanished. Or write a paper showing this. None of the ten problem on consciousness exposed in Michael Tye book are even addressed, not to mention the body problem itself.

I understand your complaint, but you realize that you are saying that because no one has written up a paper that you can read that 'shows a derivation of F=ma' that there is no solution.
Feynman derived it from the MW (to be short). And the MW is a consequence of comp (to be short). Comp can explain F=ma, except that it can, still not explain the x and t in a = d^2x/dt^2. With comp, the weird become obvious, and the obvious becomes hard, like the role of the variable x and t. But that is the point.

The x and the t are defined by the topological spaces (and functions on and in them) that are the Stone dual to the logical algebras! Can you not see this???? All of this starts with a Neutral monist ontology and the idea of dual aspect dualism emanating from the neutral ground. Numbers and all other abstracts on one side and physical entities and so forth on the other.

1004 fallacy.

By making physical events and abstract/mental/immaterial states the Stone dual of each other, neither is primitive in the absolute sense. They both emerge from the underlying primitive []<>.
With which "[]<>"?

You know what I mean, my existence theory. Existence is that which is necessarily possible, the sum of all that exists.

That does not help. Sorry.

    You are simply being incorrigible and stubborn.

Case closed.


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