On 14 Aug 2012, at 07:26, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/13/2012 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 12 Aug 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Roger, I will interleave some remarks. On 8/11/2012 7:37 AM, Roger wrote:Hi Stephen P. KingAs I understand it, Leibniz's pre-established harmony isanalogous toa musical score with God, or at least some super-intelligence, as composer/conductor.Allow me to use the analogy a bit more but carefully to not gotoo far. This "musical score", does it require work of some kindto be created itself?This prevents all physical particles from colliding, instead they all move harmoniously together*. The score was composed before theBig Bang-- my own explanation is like Mozart God or thatintelligencecould hear the whole (symphony) beforehand in his head.I argue that the Pre-Established Harmony (PEH) requiressolving an NP-Complete computational problem that has an infinitenumber of variables. Additionally, it is not possible to maximizeor optimize more than one variable in a multivariate system.Unless we are going to grant God the ability to contradictmathematical facts, which, I argue, is equivalent to grantingviolations of the basis rules of non-contradiction, then God wouldhave to run an eternal computation prior to the creation of theUniverse. This is absurd! How can the existence of something havea beginning if it requires an an infinite problem to be solvedfirst?Here is the problem: Computations require resources to run,That makes sense, but you should define what you mean by resources,as put in this way, people might think you mean "primitivelyphysical resource".Dear Bruno,"A bounded Turing machine has been used to model specificcomputations using the number of state transitions and alphabet sizeto quantify the computational effort required to solve a particularproblem." Let us supposed that the states are physical as defined inyour resent post:"This define already a realm in which all universal numberexists, and all their behavior is accessible from that simpletheory: it is sigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version ofTuring-complete. Note that such a theory is very weak, it has nonegation, and cannot prove that 0 ≠ 1, for example. Of course, itis consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates aUD through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can beproved to exist in that theory.Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, youare multiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relativecomputational state appears to be proved to exist relatively tobasically all universal numbers (and some non universal numberstoo), and this infinitely often.So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping anapple, for example, the first person indeterminacy dictates thatwhat you will feel to be experienced is given by a statistic on allcomputations (provably existing in the theory above) defined withrespect to all universal numbers.So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like'dropped apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority ofcomputation going in your actual comp state compute a state ofaffair where you see the apple falling. If you want, the reason whyapple fall is that it happens in the majority of your computationalextensions, and this has to be verified in the space of allcomputations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication(weird with respect to the idea that we are unique and are living ina unique reality). This translated the problem of "why physicallaws" into a problem of statistics in computer science, or in numbertheory."And you also wrote:"...from the first person points of view, it does look like manyuniversal system get relatively more important role. Some can begeographical, like the local chemical situation on earth (a veryspecial universal system), or your parents, but the point is thattheir stability must be justified by the "winning universal system"emerging from the competition of all universal numbers going throughyour actual state. The apparent winner seems to be the quantum one,and it has already the shape of a universal system which manage toeliminate abnormal computations by a process of destructiveinterferences. But to solve the mind body problem we have to justifythis destructive interference processes through the solution of thearithmetical or combinatorial measure problem."Does the measure cover an infinite or finite subset of theuniversals?

`It covers the whole UD* (the entire execution of the UD, contained in`

`a tiny constructive part of arithmetical truth). It is infinite. This`

`follows easily from the first person indeterminacy invariance (cf step`

`seven).`

Does the subset have to be representable as a Boolean algebra?

`This is ambiguous. I would say "yes" if by subset you mean the initial`

`segment of UD*.`

A physical state might be one that maximally exists

`... from the local first person points of view, of those dropping the`

`apple and trying to predict what they will feel. But there is no`

`physical state, only physical experience, which are not definable in`

`any third person point of view. A physical state, with comp, is not an`

`object.`

in universal numbers, but this does not really answer anything.

`Indeed, it is *the* problem, which comp formulate mathematically (even`

`arithmetically).`

The body problem is still open.

But a big part is solved.

But the body problem vanishes if we follow Pratt's prescription!

`Explain how you derive F= ma in Pratt. I don't see any shadow of this,`

`nor even an awareness that to solve the body problem in that setting.`

`Pratt shows something interesting, not that the body problem has`

`vanished. Or write a paper showing this. None of the ten problem on`

`consciousness exposed in Michael Tye book are even addressed, not to`

`mention the body problem itself.`

By making physical events and abstract/mental/immaterial states theStone dual of each other, neither is primitive in the absolutesense. They both emerge from the underlying primitive []<>.

With wich "[]<>"?

`With comp, the universal arithmetical being already got the answer,`

`and answered it.`

[]p = Bp & Dt <>p = Dp V Bf Bp = the sigma_1 complete arithmetical Beweisbar predicate (Gödel 1931) Dp = ~B~p

`Then we get for the sigma_1 p: []p -> p, p -> []<>p, and all we need`

`to show that p -> []<>p. It is just my incompetence which provides us`

`to know if this gives quantum mechanics or not. But the theory is`

`there. Comp gave no choice in this matter (pun included!).`

and if resources are not available then there is no way to claimaccess to the information that would be in the solution that thecomputation would generate. WE might try to get around thisproblem the way that Bruno does by stipulating that the "truth" ofthe solution gives it existence, but the fact that somemathematical statement or sigma_1 sentence is true (in the priorsense) does not allow it to be considered as accessible for usefor other things. For example, we could make valid claims aboutthe content of a meteor that no one has examined but we cannothave any certainty about those claims unless we actually crackopen the rock and physically examine its contents.The state of the universe as "moving harmoniously together"was not exactly what the PEH was for Leibniz. It was thesynchronization of the simple actions of the Monads. It was acoordination of the percepts that make up the monads such that,for example, my monadic percept of living in a world that you alsolive in is synchronized with your monadic view of living in aworld that I also live in such that we can be said to have thisemail chat. Remember, Monads (as defined in the Monadology) haveno windows and cannot be considered to either "exchange"substances nor are embedded in a common medium that can exchangeexcitations. The entire "common world of appearances" emerges fromand could be said to supervene upon the synchronization ofinternal (1p subjective) Monadic actions.I argue that the only way that God could find a solution tothe NP-Complete problem is to make the creation of the universesimulataneous with the computations so that the universe itself isthe computer that is finding the solution. <snip>Even some non universal machine can solve NP-complete problem.Yes, of course. But they cannot solve it in zero computationalsteps.

?

Leibniz' PEH, to be consistent with his requirement, would have todo the impossible. I am porposing a way to solve this impossibility.

?

`To be sure I am still not knowing if you have a theory, and what you`

`mean by "solve" in this setting.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.