Hi Jason Resch Wouldn't Godel incompleteness be the fatal flaw in at least some Turing machines ? Meaning, they cannot have a full set of instructions or data.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:11:45 Subject: Re: Is matter real ? Hi Roger, When I used the term universal system, I meant it in the sense of Turing universality ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_universality ). It is universal in the same sense of the word as a universal remote. A Turing universal system is one that can be used to define/emulate any finite process. In Bruno's proof, if one believes in digital mechanism, he says that the theory of everything need only be something that provides Turing universality. My question to him was whether there might be different probabilities of expectation based on which Turing universal system is assumed at the start. I have some comments interleaved below: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 9:08 AM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: Hi Jason Resch Personally I believe that the physical universe out there is physical, What makes something real? Do, you believe, for instance that there could be other physical universes out there, which we may never be able to access, but nonetheless, seem real to any life forms which might develop intelligence and consciousness in those universes? What, in your theory, delineates possibility from actuality? in the traditional sense of the word, and can be characterized for example by physical experiment. So science is fine, as far as it goes. But what we experience of the physical universe is a psychological or mental construction, so as far as our minds are concerned, it is a phenomenon. >From there on, things get a little tricky. There is a related, hotly contested point of debate which seems to some (but not me) to be a fundamental flaw in Leibniz' metaphysics. Leibniz was brilliant, but we have learned a great deal since his time. We should not expect all of his theories to be correct. Leibniz discarded the atomic view of matter and let it stand that all matter can be divided infinitety many times, so there was nothing finally that one could point to, thus something one could call "real". I am told that the 12 fundamental physical particles cannot be divided so that the divisibility argument above does not work. I would agree, but just change my definition of real, not as some thing one could point to, but the possibility of finding something there to point to. Heisenber's Uncertainty Theorem rules that out, so in the end I agree with Leibniz's conclusion -- that matter is not real. Bruno might say it is real, but not fundamental. It can be explained by something else. Also, are you familiar with the many-worlds, or many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics? If not, I think this video provides a great introduction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc The basis of Leibniz's metaphysics is that, instead, only the monads are real, since they refer to unitary substances and that these substances, taken logically, have no parts. What do you think about the idea that information is Leibniz's monad? Perhaps everything from consciousness to physical particles can be explained as an informational phenomena. Information cannot be explained in terms of anything else, and in this sense it has no parts. John Archibald Wheeler: It from bit. Otherwise put, every "it" — every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely — even if in some contexts indirectly — from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. "It from bit" symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes — no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe. Jason Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:04:33 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote: The physical universe is purely subjective. That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal system. Bruno, Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no?onsequence? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
