Bruno:

 

You've turned things around.  The implication is context to information, not
information to context.

 

And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement
regarding the computational 

omniscience of the Turing machine.  Yes, you may call it universality but
that word is in fact too 

strong; omniscience is more accurate.

 

Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer's book Biosemiotics.

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible

 

Hi William,

 

On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote:





Bruno:

 

>From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe

seems rather obvious.

 

I don't think anything is obvious here.

What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming?
What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind?

 





 

Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient

 

I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with
omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality
entails the impossibility of omniscience.

 

 





solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly

be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why,

Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable

computations.  

 

?

 

 





Somehow, where information is concerned, context

is king.

 

I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection.

 

Bruno

 

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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