Bruno:
You've turned things around. The implication is context to information, not information to context. And, I suggest you think very long and carefully about my statement regarding the computational omniscience of the Turing machine. Yes, you may call it universality but that word is in fact too strong; omniscience is more accurate. Also, read Jesper Hoffmeyer's book Biosemiotics. wrb From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 2:39 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: >From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
