John: I think those arithmetical values must be implemented in matter to become operational.
Richard: Agreed, as long as the compactified dimensions of string theory are a form of matter and I am a crackpot. On Mon, Aug 27, 2012 at 11:53 AM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Sun, Aug 26, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > A popular subproblem consists in explaining how a grey brain can >> generate the subjective color An outline would be given by >> 1) a theory of qualia. This just means some semi-axiomatic definition of >> qualia, some agreement of what characterize them, etc. (For example: qualia >> are subjective sensation >> > > > And subjective sensations are qualia. You need more than a dictionary list > of synonyms and I have no idea how to get more. And if you're not clear > about what you're trying to explain then your theory explaining that vague > mush is unlikely to be any good. > > > 2) a theory of mind. this can be computationalism, or even just computer >> science, or even just arithmetic + a supervenience thesis. >> > > By "supervenience thesis" I assume you mean a theory explaining how lower > level operations of a system, like the firing of neurons in the brain, can > lead to higher level attributes like intelligence and consciousness. Well > yes that's the name of the game and I can see how the quest for a > intelligence theory would be genuine science; but the other would not be > because consciousness theories are just too easy to crank out, out of the > infinite number of potential consciousness theories there is no way to > experimentally determine which one is correct. That is also why > consciousness theories (but not intelligence theorys!) are so popular with > crackpots. > > And its got to be more than just arithmetic. Numerical relationships > always have and always will exist, but the mind of John K Clark has not and > will not. I think those arithmetical values must be implemented in matter > to become operational. > > >> > 3) an embedding of the theory of qualia in the theory of mind, >> respecting some faithfulness conditions. >> > > Correct me if I'm wrong but I think you mean the use of induction to infer > the structure of something from statistical data, but you have no data at > all about the consciousness of anything except for that of Bruno Marchal > and you can't develop a viable theory or even use induction with only one > example. > > > Most religious belief, like the belief in the existence of primary >> matter, or of mind, or God, etc, can be seen as attempt to clarify, or >> hide, the mind-body problem. >> > > Religion never EVER clarifies anything, it just adds pointless wheels > within wheels to the problem of mind that is already complex enough as it > is. > > John K Clark > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.