On 27 Aug 2012, at 17:53, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Aug 26, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> A popular subproblem consists in explaining how a grey brain can generate the subjective color An outline would be given by 1) a theory of qualia. This just means some semi-axiomatic definition of qualia, some agreement of what characterize them, etc. (For example: qualia are subjective sensation

And subjective sensations are qualia. You need more than a dictionary list of synonyms and I have no idea how to get more. And if you're not clear about what you're trying to explain then your theory explaining that vague mush is unlikely to be any good.

See your own post. you ask me not to give the theory, just sketch the idea. Qualia are private, know, uncommunicable mental state, and much more.

> 2) a theory of mind. this can be computationalism, or even just computer science, or even just arithmetic + a supervenience thesis.

By "supervenience thesis" I assume you mean a theory
explaining how lower level operations of a system, like the firing of neurons in the brain, can lead to higher level attributes like intelligence and consciousness.

Higher level attribute are still third person descriptible. The problem is more how "neuron firing", or "information handling" can lead, or can be associated to private first person experience. Comp, but also QM, already shows that the psycho-parralelism thesis is not sustainable.

Well yes that's the name of the game and I can see how the quest for a intelligence theory would be genuine science; but the other would not be because consciousness theories are just too easy to crank out, out of the infinite number of potential consciousness theories there is no way to experimentally determine which one is correct.

This is wrong, but I can explain this only if you are able to go from step 3 to 4. Quanta are shown to be particular qualia given by a particular precise theory, so we can compare their logic qith the logic of observation. Up to now, this fits rmeakably, but of course works remains, both on the side of QM and comp to test it.

That is also why consciousness theories (but not intelligence theorys!) are so popular with crackpots.

And its got to be more than just arithmetic. Numerical relationships always have and always will exist, but the mind of John K Clark has not and will not.

Then comp is false, as the mind of John K Clark is determined only by an infinity of (complex) numerical relationships.

I think those arithmetical values must be implemented in matter to become operational.

Then comp is false, but you need to be more familiar with the first person indterminacy, which you have qualified as insane, sometimes, and trivial, some other times, yet we waiting to know what you think of step 4.

> 3) an embedding of the theory of qualia in the theory of mind, respecting some faithfulness conditions.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I think you mean the use of induction to infer the structure of something from statistical data, but you have no data at all about the consciousness of anything except for that of Bruno Marchal and you can't develop a viable theory or even use induction with only one example.

? The literature is full of data. I predicted from comp that it would be hard to get any felling of change of identity through brain perturbation, and that has been confirmed by the work of Penfield. See my long text for much more on this. There are good selected papers on pathological states of consciousness which guves a lot of original and sometimes startling information. The popular book by Oliver Sacks (the man who mistook his wife for a hat) is easy informative reading.

Also, a morphism or embedding of a theory in another is not an induction. You have a theory of qualia, (inferred by induction, or just suggested by data), you have a theory of mind (inferred from reflexion, and/or induction), and then you have a embedding of one in the other, or not, but that step does not need induction.

> Most religious belief, like the belief in the existence of primary matter, or of mind, or God, etc, can be seen as attempt to clarify, or hide, the mind-body problem.

Religion never EVER clarifies anything, it just adds pointless wheels within wheels to the problem of mind that is already complex enough as it is.

We already agree that we have an opposite opinion of what is religion. Without religion, there would be no fundamental science, as this starts from the belief in a coherent reality. Such a belief is religious as it cannot be justifiable rationally. And for both matter and mind, the consensus among experts if that such theory fails on the mind-body problem, and then comp explains why it has to fail.

It is stupid religion or stupid science only when it becomes authoritative, and when it is presented as a definitive truth, as scientists ideally never do.



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