On 29 Aug 2012, at 17:54, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Not only to lie. In order to commerce and in general to interact,
we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know
what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in
order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material
expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of
reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..
I agree, and it is plausibly related to the origin of self-
consciousness.
But consciousness itself is also plausibly more primitive. You don't
need another to feel pain, but you might still need two universal
machines in front of each other, and some other one (the computable
part of the probable environment). Perhaps.
Bruno
2012/8/29 meekerdb <[email protected]>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words.
That's why something having human like intelligence and
consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in
it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is
an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for
almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did
not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-
tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that
you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information
"craig says that he perceive"..
From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the
same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from
my side.
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
For example, consider:
"I see the cat." Here:
I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is
personal, as are all subjective
states and all experiences.
However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has
translated the experience
into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal
experience into a
publicly accessible statement.
All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in
words are objective.
Any statement is then objective.
Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are
objective,
so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is
wordless (codeless).
Roger Clough, [email protected]
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <[email protected]>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It
has memory because it is
intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs
memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
Hi Albert,
Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content
of memory and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am
what I remember myself to be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted
computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this
metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about
the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same
life of ourselves.
No, because we could never know that for sure. It is
singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me"
is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I
cannot know what it is like to be you.
That′s why this uniqueness is not essential
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed
to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self.
We could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently
created clones. Although this probably will never happen.
Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it
might occur. There is something important to this!
This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of
uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person
indeterminacy). But probably the cloning machine would never
exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <[email protected]>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
I agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
QED
Hi Roger,
It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is
not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular
(necessity) while the object is possibly singular.
Roger Clough, [email protected]
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help
illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far
as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a
meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we
presume that computation can and does exist independently of all
awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is
what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding
of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy
and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of
these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic
truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to
support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that
indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete,
especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect
that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding
of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough
to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead
end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we
assume consciousness as a possibility
a priori
and independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into
this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically
necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is
in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried
to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a
negative assertion of computability.
I bring up
the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a
symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic
vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow
from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a
method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of
privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public'
levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic
to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage
the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique
significance rather than
to
decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived
from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings
and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
--
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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