On 29 Aug 2012, at 17:54, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Not only to lie. In order to commerce and in general to interact, we need to know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me. This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the beginning..

I agree, and it is plausibly related to the origin of self- consciousness. But consciousness itself is also plausibly more primitive. You don't need another to feel pain, but you might still need two universal machines in front of each other, and some other one (the computable part of the probable environment). Perhaps.

Bruno




2012/8/29 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter- tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.

Brent


On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..

From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith

What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Alberto G. Corona

The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.

For example, consider:

"I see the cat."    Here:

I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.

When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are all subjective
states and all experiences.

However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the experience into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into a
publicly accessible statement.

All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are objective.
Any statement is then objective.

Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless (codeless).


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary



2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
the subject  is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.

Hi Albert,

    Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and how it is sequentially ordered  that matters. "I am what I remember myself to be."


in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.

This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of ourselves.

    No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.

That′s why this uniqueness is not  essential

But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other ourselves.  Most twins consider each other another self. We  could come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this probably will never happen.

    Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There is something important to this!

This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy).  But probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate further....



2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
 
I agree.
 
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
 
Cs = subject + object
 
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
 
QED
Hi Roger,

    It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.

 
 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary

This sentence does not speak English.

These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.

s     l u     ,u     s   


If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.

The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness. Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.

Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G  del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.

Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.

As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.

Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.

Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?

Craig


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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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