Bruno wrote: *Intuitively it is the limit of the number going through your actual state in bigger and bigger finite portions of the UD*. Technically you need the logic S4grz1, Z1* and X1* to define it properly. We know it is exists if comp is correct, and so we an use it to test comp. The measure one has a logic which is already well defined at the propositional level, and it has already enough quantum feature to define an arithmetical quantization...*
** *A L L* are product of (human?) *thinking* - arguments from within. Like * religious* 'evidences' from alleged deeds of an alleged god (or dreams). Do we have anything better? I don't (especially with some mechanism attached). * John M *On Sat, Sep 1, 2012 at 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 31 Aug 2012, at 19:39, meekerdb wrote: > > On 8/31/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> >>> On 30 Aug 2012, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 8/30/2012 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 30 Aug 2012, at 17:16, Brian Tenneson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Thinking implies a progression of time. So perhaps it is equally >>>>>> important to define time. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In the computationlist theory, the digital discrete sequence 0, s(0), >>>>> s(s(0)) ... is enough, notably to named the steps of execution of the UD >>>>> (UD*), or of the programs execution we can see in UD*, or equivalently in >>>>> a >>>>> tiny subset of arithmetical truth. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Are you saying time-order corresponds to the order of execution of >>>> steps in the UD? >>>> >>> >>> The first person time-order is given by the relative measure on the >>> computations. >>> >> >> ?? But what is that measure. >> > > Intuitively it is the limit of the number going through your actual state > in bigger and bigger finite portions of the UD*. Technically you need the > logic S4grz1, Z1* and X1* to define it properly. We know it is exists if > comp is correct, and so we an use it to test comp. The measure one has a > logic which is already well defined at the propositional level, and it has > already enough quantum feature to define an arithmetical quantization. > > > > > > > Are you saying 1p experiences on exist in an implicit order when all the >> uncountably infinite UD computations are done? >> > > With a large sense of order, this is a consequence of the invariance of > the first person experience for the delays of reconstitution in UD*. > > > > > >> But this relies on all computations, and they need a third person >>> time-order, and I am just saying that this one is reducible by the natural >>> number order. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't see how that can be consistent with your idea that our sequence >>>> of conscious experiences corresponds to a "closest continuation" of a our >>>> present state. Our present state is supposedly visited infinitely many >>>> times by the UD. >>>> >>> >>> Yes, that is for the first person time order, and thus for the physical >>> time too, as the whole physics emerges from the first person plural >>> indeterminacy. But to define computation, we need a thrid person time, and >>> for this one, as the UD illustrates, we need only the natural number >>> canonical order: 0, 1, 2, 3, ... >>> >> >> That's sort of a no-person time; >> > > OK. > > > > > a time not experienced or accessible to anyone. >> > > ? > 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, ... > I just access it right now. > > > > > I think of third person time as something like proper time in GR or >> entropy increase - the sort of time that people can reach intersubjective >> agreement about, what you measure on a clock. >> > > OK. > > > > >> I don't know which Brian was referring to, but I doubt it was the >> no-person time of the UD. >> > > I don't know. > > Bruno > > > > > >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%[email protected]>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
