Bruno wrote:

*Intuitively it is the limit of the number going through your actual state
in bigger and bigger finite portions of the UD*. Technically you need the
logic S4grz1, Z1* and X1* to define it properly. We know it is exists if
comp is correct, and so we an use it to test comp. The measure one has a
logic which is already well defined at the propositional level, and it has
already enough quantum feature to define an arithmetical quantization...*

**
*A L L*  are product of (human?) *thinking* - arguments from within. Like *
religious* 'evidences' from alleged deeds of an alleged god (or dreams).
Do we have anything better? I don't (especially with some mechanism
attached).
*
John M
*On Sat, Sep 1, 2012 at 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 31 Aug 2012, at 19:39, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 8/31/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Aug 2012, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8/30/2012 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 30 Aug 2012, at 17:16, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thinking implies a progression of time.  So perhaps it is equally
>>>>>> important to define time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In the computationlist theory, the digital discrete sequence 0, s(0),
>>>>> s(s(0)) ... is enough, notably to named the steps of execution of the UD
>>>>> (UD*), or of the programs execution we can see in UD*, or equivalently in 
>>>>> a
>>>>> tiny subset of arithmetical truth.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Are you saying time-order corresponds to the order of execution of
>>>> steps in the UD?
>>>>
>>>
>>> The first person time-order is given by the relative measure on the
>>> computations.
>>>
>>
>> ?? But what is that measure.
>>
>
> Intuitively it is the limit of the number going through your actual state
> in bigger and bigger finite portions of the UD*. Technically you need the
> logic S4grz1, Z1* and X1* to define it properly. We know it is exists if
> comp is correct, and so we an use it to test comp. The measure one has a
> logic which is already well defined at the propositional level, and it has
> already enough quantum feature to define an arithmetical quantization.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Are you saying 1p experiences on exist in an implicit order when all the
>> uncountably infinite UD computations are done?
>>
>
> With a large sense of order, this is a consequence of the invariance of
> the first person experience for the delays of reconstitution in UD*.
>
>
>
>
>
>> But this relies on all computations, and they need a third person
>>> time-order, and I am just saying that this one is  reducible by the natural
>>> number order.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see how that can be consistent with your idea that our sequence
>>>> of conscious experiences corresponds to a "closest continuation" of a our
>>>> present state.  Our present state is supposedly visited infinitely many
>>>> times by the UD.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, that is for the first person time order, and thus for the physical
>>> time too, as the whole physics emerges from the first person plural
>>> indeterminacy. But to define computation, we need a thrid person time, and
>>> for this one, as the UD illustrates, we need only the natural number
>>> canonical order: 0, 1, 2, 3, ...
>>>
>>
>> That's sort of a no-person time;
>>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
> a time not experienced or accessible to anyone.
>>
>
> ?
> 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, ...
> I just access it right now.
>
>
>
>
> I think of third person time as something like proper time in GR or
>> entropy increase - the sort of time that people can reach intersubjective
>> agreement about, what you measure on a clock.
>>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
>> I don't know which Brian was referring to, but I doubt it was the
>> no-person time of the UD.
>>
>
> I don't know.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>> Brent
>>
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>
>
>
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