On 8/31/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Aug 2012, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/30/2012 9:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Aug 2012, at 17:16, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Thinking implies a progression of time. So perhaps it is equally important to define
In the computationlist theory, the digital discrete sequence 0, s(0), s(s(0)) ... is
enough, notably to named the steps of execution of the UD (UD*), or of the programs
execution we can see in UD*, or equivalently in a tiny subset of arithmetical truth.
Are you saying time-order corresponds to the order of execution of steps in the
The first person time-order is given by the relative measure on the computations.
?? But what is that measure. Are you saying 1p experiences on exist in an implicit order
when all the uncountably infinite UD computations are done?
But this relies on all computations, and they need a third person time-order, and I am
just saying that this one is reducible by the natural number order.
I don't see how that can be consistent with your idea that our sequence of conscious
experiences corresponds to a "closest continuation" of a our present state. Our
present state is supposedly visited infinitely many times by the UD.
Yes, that is for the first person time order, and thus for the physical time too, as the
whole physics emerges from the first person plural indeterminacy. But to define
computation, we need a thrid person time, and for this one, as the UD illustrates, we
need only the natural number canonical order: 0, 1, 2, 3, ...
That's sort of a no-person time; a time not experienced or accessible to anyone. I think
of third person time as something like proper time in GR or entropy increase - the sort of
time that people can reach intersubjective agreement about, what you measure on a clock.
I don't know which Brian was referring to, but I doubt it was the no-person
time of the UD.
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