On Tuesday, September 4, 2012 10:09:45 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
> > *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the
> > thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain
> > function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning
> > non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality
> > a universal commodity.
> Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough.
Maybe. In the sense that sleight of hand implies intentional deception.
More of a de facto sleight of hand.
> It is the meat of the
> comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
> explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
> thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences
> of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
> computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to your
If they do not apply to my worldview, then they compete with my worldview,
so I am entitled to debunk the premises, if not the consequences of the
> > *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of
> > supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a
> > theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from
> > the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data
> > or exit a computation?
> It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two
> questions simply are relevant.
That's begging the question. Why are mathematical theses necessarily
abstract? My point is that if we assume abstraction is possible from the
start, then physics and subjective realism become irrelevant and redundant
> > *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying
> > independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the
> > Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the
> > beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
> > constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of
> > that.
> AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an
> ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive
> reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural
What is that implication or commitment based on? Naive preference for logic
> In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive reality
> sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality
> because it is more familiar to his correspondents.
> > Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull
> > arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
> Again, these two questions seem irrelevant.
Why? They are counterfactuals for comp. If primitive realism is modeled on
natural numbers, why does physically originated noise and entropy distort
the execution of arithmetic processes but arithmetic processes do not, by
themselves, counter things like signal attenuation? Good programs should
heal bad wiring.
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