On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 07:26:53PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, September 4, 2012 10:09:45 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
> > It is the meat of the 
> > comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very 
> > explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a 
> > thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences 
> > of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept 
> > computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to your 
> > worldview. 
> >
> 
> If they do not apply to my worldview, then they compete with my worldview, 
> so I am entitled to debunk the premises, if not the consequences of the 
> argument.

Good luck with that! Seriously, though, what you need to do is derive some
consequences of the premises that contradict observations. Or show the
premises to be self-contradictory. It is not enough to show that the
premises contradict some other totally random premise, as not everyone
is likely to agree that the other premise is self-evident.

>  
> 
> >
> > > 
> > > *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of 
> > resources, 
> > > supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a 
> > > theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from 
> > > the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data 
> > enter 
> > > or exit a computation? 
> >
> > It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two 
> > questions simply are relevant. 
> >
> 
> That's begging the question. Why are mathematical theses necessarily 
> abstract? 

Surely that is the point of mathematics!

> My point is that if we assume abstraction is possible from the 
> start, then physics and subjective realism become irrelevant and redundant 
> appendages.
> 

Why?

> 
> > > 
> > > *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying 
> > > independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the 
> > dark. 
> > > Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the 
> > > beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic 
> > > constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of 
> > > that. 
> >
> > AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an 
> > ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive 
> > reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural 
> > numbers. 
> >
> 
> What is that implication or commitment based on? Naive preference for logic 
> over sensation?
>  

Does it need to be based on anything?

> 
> >
> > In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive reality 
> > is 
> > sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality 
> > because it is more familiar to his correspondents. 
> >
> > > Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull 
> > toward 
> > > arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from? 
> > > 
> >
> > Again, these two questions seem irrelevant. 
> >
>  
> Why? They are counterfactuals for comp. If primitive realism is modeled on 
> natural numbers, why does physically originated noise and entropy distort 
> the execution of arithmetic processes but arithmetic processes do not, by 
> themselves, counter things like signal attenuation? Good programs should 
> heal bad wiring.
> 

Erroneous computations are still computations. Are you trying to
suggest that the presence of randomness is a counterfactual for COMP perhaps?

-- 

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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