On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 07:26:53PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Tuesday, September 4, 2012 10:09:45 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: > > It is the meat of the > > comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very > > explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a > > thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences > > of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept > > computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to your > > worldview. > > > > If they do not apply to my worldview, then they compete with my worldview, > so I am entitled to debunk the premises, if not the consequences of the > argument.
Good luck with that! Seriously, though, what you need to do is derive some consequences of the premises that contradict observations. Or show the premises to be self-contradictory. It is not enough to show that the premises contradict some other totally random premise, as not everyone is likely to agree that the other premise is self-evident. > > > > > > > > > > *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of > > resources, > > > supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a > > > theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from > > > the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data > > enter > > > or exit a computation? > > > > It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two > > questions simply are relevant. > > > > That's begging the question. Why are mathematical theses necessarily > abstract? Surely that is the point of mathematics! > My point is that if we assume abstraction is possible from the > start, then physics and subjective realism become irrelevant and redundant > appendages. > Why? > > > > > > > *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying > > > independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the > > dark. > > > Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the > > > beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic > > > constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of > > > that. > > > > AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an > > ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive > > reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural > > numbers. > > > > What is that implication or commitment based on? Naive preference for logic > over sensation? > Does it need to be based on anything? > > > > > In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive reality > > is > > sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality > > because it is more familiar to his correspondents. > > > > > Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull > > toward > > > arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from? > > > > > > > Again, these two questions seem irrelevant. > > > > Why? They are counterfactuals for comp. If primitive realism is modeled on > natural numbers, why does physically originated noise and entropy distort > the execution of arithmetic processes but arithmetic processes do not, by > themselves, counter things like signal attenuation? Good programs should > heal bad wiring. > Erroneous computations are still computations. Are you trying to suggest that the presence of randomness is a counterfactual for COMP perhaps? -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
