On 9/5/2012 11:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/5/2012 12:14 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:

*yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire
thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain
function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is
a universal commodity.
Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the
comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences
of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to your

I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion that everything is computable.

Hear Hear! And if it is computable then it is nothing but countable and recursively enumerable functions. But can functions generate I/O from themselves?

You lost me. Functions are set of I/O.

Input/Output is interfacing, it is at least a second-order function. More on this soon.

We see nice examples of entire computable universes in MMORP games that have many people addicted to them. One thing about them, we require resources to be run. Nothing happens if you don't pay the fee.

*Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources,
supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a
theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter
or exit a computation?
It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two
questions simply are relevant.

*Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark.
Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the
beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of
AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an
ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive
reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural

ISTM that Bruno rejects any reality behind the natural numbers (or other system of computation). If often argues that the natural numbers exist, because they satisfy true propositions: There exists a prime number between 1 and 3, therefore 2 exists. This assumes a Platonist view of mathematical objects, which Peter D. Jones has argued against.

Platonism fails because it cannot explain how many minds interact. It is a wonderful ontology theory of a single mind, but not of many differing minds.

I don't see this at all. many minds comes from the fact that universal machine can interact.

    With what? Itself?

That the easy thing to explain, seen also by Schmidhuber and Tegmark, but as Deustch argued, this explains to much. Yet Deustch critics either assumes non comp, or is inconsistent, as comp implies the realities used by Schmidhuber and Tegmark. What the three of them ignores is that this entails also the first person indeterminacy, and this makes the idea of interaction or physics entirely and necessarily retrievable from self-reference, and this works well until now. Then we have the "Solovay" gift, the splitting between provable and true-but-non-provable, whose intensional variants explains completely the quanta/qualia divergence.

Deutsch. Tegmark and Schmidhuber do not explicitly consider the interaction question and so miss the point. They seem to just assume the equivalent to 1p indeterminacy via local individuation.

You keep saying that interaction is not explained by comp, but this makes no sense, as a computation, even in arithmetic, is only a matter of local interactions.

How is "locality" explained by COMP? Locality induces the ability to distinguish what is otherwise indistinguishable. If there is no "Moscow" that is different from "Washington" how does 1p indeterminacy obtain?

It is the essence of computability to reduce activity into local tiny elementary interactions.

You are discussing a different issue, using the idea of neighborhood, as in the sequence 1234: 2 is local to 1 and 3.

Then physical-like interaction must be recovered at the more holistic level of the machine's epistemological person views.







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