I don't think that life or mind or intelligence can be teleported. Especially since nobody knows what they are.
I also don't believe that you can download the contents of somebody's brain. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/5/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so that everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-05, 11:04:53 Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:14, meekerdb wrote: > On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >> On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions: >>> >>> *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up >>> the entire >>> thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain >>> function and that your brain function can be replaced by the >>> functioning of >>> non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human >>> individuality is >>> a universal commodity. >> Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the >> comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very >> explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a >> thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the consequences >> of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept >> computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to >> your >> worldview. > > I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the > computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an > outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain > conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of > the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even > the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in > order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers > me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed > universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has > been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion > that everything is computable. That's a good argument for saying that the level of substitution is not that low. But the reasoning would still go through, and we would lead to a unique computable universe. That is the only way to make a digital physics consistent (as I forget to say sometimes). Then you get a more complex "other mind problem", and something like David Nyman- Hoyle beam would be needed, and would need to be separate from the physical reality, making the big physical whole incomplete, etc. yes this bothers me too. Needless to say, I tend to believe that if comp is true, the level is much higher. > >> >>> *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of >>> resources, >>> supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a >>> theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from >>> realism from >>> the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does >>> data enter >>> or exit a computation? >> It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two >> questions simply are relevant. >> >>> *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self >>> justifying >>> independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in >>> the dark. >>> Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the >>> beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic >>> constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of >>> that. >> AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an >> ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive >> reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural >> numbers. > > ISTM that Bruno rejects any reality behind the natural numbers (or > other system of computation). If often argues that the natural > numbers exist, because they satisfy true propositions: There exists > a prime number between 1 and 3, therefore 2 exists. This assumes a > Platonist view of mathematical objects, which Peter D. Jones has > argued against. ? I would say that the contrary is true. It is because natural numbers exists, and seems to obeys laws like addition and multiplication that true propositions can be made on them. 2 exists, and only 1 and 2 divides 2, so 2 is prime, and thus prime numbers exists. 2 itself exists just because Ex(x = s(s(0))) is true. Indeed take x = s(s(0)), and the proposition follows from s(s(0)) = s(s(0)). Bruno > > Brent > >> >> In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive >> reality is >> sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality >> because it is more familiar to his correspondents. >> >>> Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the >>> pull toward >>> arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come >>> from? >>> >> Again, these two questions seem irrelevant. >> >>> Craig >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Pc173EEJR4IJ >>> . >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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