On 14 Sep 2012, at 19:02, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/14/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:44, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
<SNIP>
BRUNO: Matter is what is not determined, and thus contingent
indeed, at its very roots, like W and M in a self-duplication
experiment, or like, plausibly when looking at a photon through a
calcite crystal.
ROGER: So Newton's Laws, such as F = ma, are not deterministic ?
It means that F = ma, if correct, can only be an approximation of a
deeper non deterministic process.
Hi Bruno,
What does this mean? If we assume a stochastic process, like
Markov or Weiner, then we can only do so in a framework that allows
for an ordering of the events to be defined. Strict indeterminacy is
a self-contradictory concept.
?
Note that it is actually the case, as F=ma can be derived from the
more fundamental schroedinger equation, which indeed give rise to a
first person plural indeterminacy.
I wish that you would explain how this is the case. Your
explanation in terms of cut and paste operations assumes a unifying
framework of a single word that has the room for he multiple copies.
You seem to ignore this necessity in your step 8.
I was alluding to Feynman phase randomization, not comp. This well
explain in his little book on light.
ROGER: and in which men, so as not to be robots,
BRUNO: You might try to be polite with the robots, and with your
son in law, victim of pro-life doctors who gave him an artificial
brain without its consent. He does not complain on the
artificial brain, though, as he is glad to be alive. Do you think
it is a (philosophical) zombie? Come on! He is a Lutheran.
Obviously, if you decide that a machine cannot be a Lutheran, few
machines will be ...
ROGER: I may be wrong, but I don't see how an artifical brain can
have any awareness or intelligence, for these require life-- real
life.
As you say, you might be wrong.
I agree with Bruno. So long as the person with the artificial
brain can behave and respond to interviews the same way as a "real
person" what is the difference that makes a difference?
Actually I don't use this (even if I agree). But if you agree with
this, then it is even more mysterious that you have a problem with the
idea that physics is derivable from arithmetic, because in arithmetic
the program have the right behavior, by definition of comp. They just
lack primitive physical bodies.
Nobody understand how a machine, or a brain, can feel, but machine
can already explain why they can know some true fact without being
able to justify them---at all.
With the good hypotheses, sometimes we can explain why there are
things that we cannot explain.
Please understand, Bruno, that you are tacitly assuming a common
framework or schemata what allows the comparison of "a machine that
can explain ..." and a "machine that cannot explain...".
I assume elementary arithmetic, and that is enough for such a purpose.
This is the mistake that you and Maudlin commit in the MGA argument.
Contrafactuals depend on just their "possibility to act" for their
capacity, not on their actual state of affairs.
I agree but don't see the mistake. You are not clear enough.
Bruno
And you might be true, but your personal feeling cannot be used in
this setting, as they can only look like prejudices, even if true.
The best is to keep the mind open, to make clear assumptions and to
reason, without ever pretending to know the public truth.
I agree.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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