On 9/16/2012 8:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Mereology seems to be something like Spinoza's metaphysics,
that there is just one stuff in the universe and that stuff is God.
So there is just one material.
Hi Roger,
Yes. Each of these philosophers focused on different things, but
they all seemed to agree on the idea of a "fundamental substance". This
is the idea that Bruno denotes as "primitive matter". On analysis of the
concept it can be understood that this "substance" is nothing more than
a empty "bearer of properties". I think that "existence" itself, the
"necessarily possible", is sufficient to "bundle" properties together.
Leibniz is completely diffferent. Every substance is not only
different, it keeps changing, and changing more than its shape,
and is a reflection of the whole universe.
I suspect that Leibniz saw Becoming as fundamental (the Heraclitus
view) and thus considered all properties as the result of some process,
some kind of change. His problem is that he neglected to examine in
detail the fact that we cannot assume a change without having a way to
measure its incrementation. Perhaps he merely assumes, with Newton, that
God's metronome, clocked all change equally. Modern incarnations of this
idea are evident in "Universe as Cellular automata" theories and those
fail for the same reason as L's idea. We can repair and rehabilitate
these idea by a careful consideration of what Special and General
Relativity can tell us.
The "changing" and the "different" aspects means Leibniz is non-materialistic.
And all of my comments could have been said by Leibniz.
I disagree. He was not non-materialistic at all, he just put the
burden of distinguishing matter from non-matter into the hands of God
and its PEH. He avoided the hard problems.
Roger Clough, [email protected]
9/16/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
snip
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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