On 9/14/2012 12:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 8:32 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:

     I contend that universality is the independence of computations
    to any particular machine but there must be at least one physical
    system that can implement a given computation for that computation
    to be knowable. This is just a accessibility question, in the
    Kripke sense of accessible worlds
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accessibility_relation>.


Stephen,

Could you provide a definition of what you mean by 'physical system'?

Hi Jason,

Sure! A physical system is a scheme of invariant relata that has some non-invertible dynamic that can be functionally equivalent to some computation.


Do you think it is possible, even in theory, for entities to distinguish whether they are in a physical system or a mathematical one?

    Not if we remove the means to distinguish self from "not-self".

 If so, what difference would they test to make that distinction?

Physical systems have the capacity to be "located". This is a difference over and beyond the internal distinctions of things. I am trying to point out that one cannot just assume that other minds exist to solve the "other minds" problem. One has to have a sufficient reason to assume that "I am not just the sum of things that I can imagine".


Thanks,

Jason
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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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