Stephen,

I'm not sure if you might have missed this message.  You have made other
replies in this thread, but not to the below message:

Thanks,

Jason

On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 12:43 PM, Stephen P. King 
> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>
>>  On 9/14/2012 12:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 8:32 AM, Stephen P. King 
>> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>>
>>>   I contend that universality is the independence of computations to
>>> any particular machine but there must be at least one physical system that
>>> can implement a given computation for that computation to be knowable. This
>>> is just a accessibility question, in the Kripke sense of accessible
>>> worlds <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accessibility_relation>.
>>>
>>>
>> Stephen,
>>
>>  Could you provide a definition of what you mean by 'physical system'?
>>
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>>     Sure! A physical system is a scheme of invariant relata
>>
>
> I had to look up the definition of relata, and found: plural of relatum,
> and relatum = "one of the objects between which a relation is said to
> hold"
>
> So is it an accurate translation of "invariant relata" a "set of fixed
> relations that exist between objects"?
>
>
>> that has some non-invertible dynamic
>>
>
> I am not sure what you mean by "non-invertible dynamic".  As the dynamics
> of our universe appear to be invertible, I assume you mean something else,
> right?
>
>
>> that can be functionally equivalent to some computation.
>>
>>
> I think I understand what you mean here.
>
>
>>
>>
>>  Do you think it is possible, even in theory, for entities to
>> distinguish whether they are in a physical system or a mathematical one?
>>
>>
>>     Not if we remove the means to distinguish self from "not-self".
>>
>
> I don't know why or how we could do this, or even fully understand what
> you mean by it.
>
> In any case, I asked if there is a way to make this distinction "even in
> theory".  So in theory, we don't have to remove the means to distinguish
> self from not-self, correct?  In that case, how would we make the
> distinction between physical universe and mathematical universe?
>
>
>>
>>
>>   If so, what difference would they test to make that distinction?
>>
>>
>>     Physical systems have the capacity to be "located".
>>
>
> Where is our universe located?  What could its location be relative to?
>
>
>>  This is a difference over and beyond the internal distinctions of things.
>>
>
> Things can be located (relative to each other) in a mathematical universe
> too.
>
>
>>  I am trying to point out that one cannot just assume that other minds
>> exist to solve the "other minds" problem.
>>
>
> What problems arise if there is one mind or many?
>
>
>>  One has to have a sufficient reason to assume that "I am not just the
>> sum of things that I can imagine".
>>
>>
> I don't think this goes against what Bruno's UDA suggests.  It is wrong, I
> think, to interpret the UDA as implying we are a bunch of
> computational Boltzmann brains existing independently in the UD.  Instead,
> there may be an infinite number of "universes" (not what Bruno typically
> means by universe) which are mutually isolated and possibly digital or
> computational.  Observers may exist (in effect, as sub-programs) within
> these universes and interact with each other.  The trouble begins when any
> observer tries to determine which of these universes they exist in.  In
> effect, there may be an infinite number, and it is impossible to ever lock
> down which one it is.  Each measurement an observer performs changes the
> answer to that question.
>
> Jason
>
>

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