Stephen, I'm not sure if you might have missed this message. You have made other replies in this thread, but not to the below message:

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Thanks, Jason On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 12:43 PM, Stephen P. King > <stephe...@charter.net>wrote: > >> On 9/14/2012 12:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 8:32 AM, Stephen P. King >> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote: >> >>> I contend that universality is the independence of computations to >>> any particular machine but there must be at least one physical system that >>> can implement a given computation for that computation to be knowable. This >>> is just a accessibility question, in the Kripke sense of accessible >>> worlds <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accessibility_relation>. >>> >>> >> Stephen, >> >> Could you provide a definition of what you mean by 'physical system'? >> >> >> Hi Jason, >> >> Sure! A physical system is a scheme of invariant relata >> > > I had to look up the definition of relata, and found: plural of relatum, > and relatum = "one of the objects between which a relation is said to > hold" > > So is it an accurate translation of "invariant relata" a "set of fixed > relations that exist between objects"? > > >> that has some non-invertible dynamic >> > > I am not sure what you mean by "non-invertible dynamic". As the dynamics > of our universe appear to be invertible, I assume you mean something else, > right? > > >> that can be functionally equivalent to some computation. >> >> > I think I understand what you mean here. > > >> >> >> Do you think it is possible, even in theory, for entities to >> distinguish whether they are in a physical system or a mathematical one? >> >> >> Not if we remove the means to distinguish self from "not-self". >> > > I don't know why or how we could do this, or even fully understand what > you mean by it. > > In any case, I asked if there is a way to make this distinction "even in > theory". So in theory, we don't have to remove the means to distinguish > self from not-self, correct? In that case, how would we make the > distinction between physical universe and mathematical universe? > > >> >> >> If so, what difference would they test to make that distinction? >> >> >> Physical systems have the capacity to be "located". >> > > Where is our universe located? What could its location be relative to? > > >> This is a difference over and beyond the internal distinctions of things. >> > > Things can be located (relative to each other) in a mathematical universe > too. > > >> I am trying to point out that one cannot just assume that other minds >> exist to solve the "other minds" problem. >> > > What problems arise if there is one mind or many? > > >> One has to have a sufficient reason to assume that "I am not just the >> sum of things that I can imagine". >> >> > I don't think this goes against what Bruno's UDA suggests. It is wrong, I > think, to interpret the UDA as implying we are a bunch of > computational Boltzmann brains existing independently in the UD. Instead, > there may be an infinite number of "universes" (not what Bruno typically > means by universe) which are mutually isolated and possibly digital or > computational. Observers may exist (in effect, as sub-programs) within > these universes and interact with each other. The trouble begins when any > observer tries to determine which of these universes they exist in. In > effect, there may be an infinite number, and it is impossible to ever lock > down which one it is. Each measurement an observer performs changes the > answer to that question. > > Jason > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.