On 23 Sep 2012, at 09:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 22.09.2012 22:49 meekerdb said the following:
On 9/22/2012 6:29 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 22.09.2012 14:58 Bruno Marchal said the following:


It is part of what a machine is that we cannot know what we are
doing in building them, so human might as well build a conscious
machine without knowing it; except later, when the machine
complains or fight for its right. Comp is rather negative on the
idea of programming consciousness. We can only let consciousness
manifest itself, or not. Or we can copy intelligent machine,
partially or completely.

Then, I am afraid, comp is of no help to the AI community as it
seems cannot guide engineers on how to develop an intelligent


In the past, Bruno has said that a machine that understands
transfinite induction will be conscious.  But being conscious and
intelligent are not the same thing.


In my view this is the same as epiphenomenalism. Engineers develop a robot to achieve a prescribed function. They do not care about consciousness in this respect. Then consciousness will appear automatically but the function developed by engineers does not depend on it. Hence epiphenomenalism seems to apply.

Not at all. Study UDA to see why exactly, but if comp is correct, consciousness is somehow what defines the physical realities, making possible for engineers to build the machines, and then consciousness, despite not being programmable per se, does have a role, like relatively speeding up the computations. Like "non free will", the "epiphenomenalism" is only "apparent" because you take the "outer god's eyes view", but with comp, there is no matter, nor consciousness, at that level, and we have no access at all at that level (without assuming comp, and accessing it intellectually, that is only arithmetic).

This is hard to explain if you fail to see the physics/machine's psychology/theology reversal. You are still (consciously or not) maintaining the physical supervenience thesis, or an aristotelian ontology, but comp prevents this to be possible.



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