On 23.09.2012 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 23 Sep 2012, at 09:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 22.09.2012 22:49 meekerdb said the following:
In the past, Bruno has said that a machine that understands
transfinite induction will be conscious. But being conscious
and intelligent are not the same thing.
In my view this is the same as epiphenomenalism. Engineers develop
a robot to achieve a prescribed function. They do not care about
consciousness in this respect. Then consciousness will appear
automatically but the function developed by engineers does not
depend on it. Hence epiphenomenalism seems to apply.
Not at all. Study UDA to see why exactly, but if comp is correct,
consciousness is somehow what defines the physical realities, making
possible for engineers to build the machines, and then
consciousness, despite not being programmable per se, does have a
role, like relatively speeding up the computations. Like "non free
will", the "epiphenomenalism" is only "apparent" because you take
the "outer god's eyes view", but with comp, there is no matter, nor
consciousness, at that level, and we have no access at all at that
level (without assuming comp, and accessing it intellectually, that
is only arithmetic).
This is hard to explain if you fail to see the physics/machine's
psychology/theology reversal. You are still (consciously or not)
maintaining the physical supervenience thesis, or an aristotelian
ontology, but comp prevents this to be possible.
I have considered a concrete case, when engineers develop a robot, not a
general one. For such a concrete case, I do not understand your answer.
I have understood Brent in such a way that when engineers develop a
robot they must just care about functionality to achieve and they can
ignore consciousness at all. Whether it appears in the robot or not, it
is not a business of engineers. Do you agree with such a statement or not?
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