With "by real computers made of ordinary matter." I mean that the
computers are structures within the mathematical manifold that describe the
physical reality (or the tip of the iceberg).
2012/10/7 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
>
>
> 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>
>>
>> On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>
>> Hi Roger:
>>
>> ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary
>> psychology (that study the software or mind) assert that this is true.
>>
>>
>> Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology
>> still does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular
>> mind-body issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be
>> shown contradictory(*).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is
>> crucial for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions
>> and phenomena with the timeless, reversible, mathematical nature of the
>> laws of physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also
>> dualities between the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the
>> planck scale (we can not know if we live in such a small brane).
>>
>>
>> OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at
>> least) direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the
>> neoplatonists already did.
>>
>>
>>
>> I don´t assume either if this mathematical nature is or not the ultimate
>> nature or reality
>>
>>
>> Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp
>> frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough.
>> Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe
>> completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of
>> what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano
>> Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like "new person", and it put only
>> more mess in Platonia.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind
>> along the line of life in space-time) make use a sort of duality in
>> category theory between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as
>> Stephen told me and he can explain you) .
>>
>>
>> Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and
>> matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more
>> that matter is an iceberg tip of "reality".
>>
>> Even if matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if "matter"?
> do we can know about it this submerged computational nature? which
> phenomena produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we
> perceive?. Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs,
> but this is a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative
> business. What the computational nature of reality tries to explain or to
> avoid? . May be you answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me
> and I did not realize it)
>
> By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing
> a computational theory of ultimate reality. I try to demolish it from
> above, by proposing that perceptions are the effect of computation in
> living beings for survival . I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp
> hypothesis can also be applied at a level above phisical reality instead of
> below: a substitution at the axon firing level could be used to substitute
> a part of the brain by computer chips (by making the chips to inject axonic
> signals) + perhaps some hormonal control. This substitution level
> Matrix-style can produce the same first person indeterminacy and still the
> computation is made within this reality, by real computers made of ordinary
> matter.
>
> This is enough for a discussion.
>
>
>> Eventually matter emerge from dreams coherence conditions. Dreams are
>> just the first person view on the relevant computations which exists by
>> elementary arithmetic.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> For the perception of time or for the ordering of past events in time
>> since future events are unknown due to the increasing entropy, the mind
>> would make use of another mathematical structure with a relation of order.
>>
>>
>> I agree, and N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... } is quite enough, at least with
>> the addition and multiplication laws. You can define the order by the order
>> relation x < y, that you can define for example by Ez(x + z = y & ~(z =
>> 0)). That order is enough to define the order of the computational steps in
>> any computations.
>>
>> With computationalism, physics is *literally* entirely reducible to
>> computer science (= number theory or combinator theory), in a sense similar
>> to the fact that current biology is literally reducible to chemistry,
>> itself reducible to physics. Note that computer science refers to number
>> crunching and syntactical manipulations, but also to the many semantics of
>> programs and computations, like Scott denotational semantics, or like those
>> derived from mathematical logic (self-reference theory, model theory,
>> Curry-Howard isomorphism, etc.).
>>
>> Here, the use of self-reference makes it possible to explain the *whole*
>> of physics: that is the quanta *and* the qualia together, and why they
>> seems (and are) different. All universal numbers, when looking inward, find
>> that same universal qualia-quanta distinctions. Note this makes comp
>> testable, as you can compare the quanta behavior found by machine
>> introspection with what we can observe, and in that sense, we can say that
>> QM-without-collapse is quite an ally, up to now, to the comp postulate.
>> Newton physics, once assessed, would have violate the comp theory.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> (*)
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>>
>>
>> 2012/10/6 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm
>>>
>>>
>>> Kant's "Copernican Revolution"
>>>
>>> " Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican
>>> Revolution,"
>>> that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object
>>> possible
>>> rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This
>>> introduced
>>> the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a
>>> passive
>>> recipient of perception. Something like this now seems obvious: the
>>> mind could
>>> be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of
>>> silicon chips
>>> could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e.
>>> recognized,
>>> or it would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to
>>> us," as Kant
>>> alternatively puts it. "
>>> .
>>>
>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>> 10/6/2012
>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>> From: Craig Weinberg
>>> Receiver: everything-list
>>> Time: 2012-10-05, 10:42:30
>>> Subject: Re: A "grand hypothesis" about order, life, and consciousness
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, October 5, 2012 7:05:06 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> So it is reasonable to define life as that which can produce order
>>> out of chaos" *. Since at least higher living beings
>>> also possess consciousness, my "grand" hypothesis is that
>>>
>>> life = consciousness = awareness = producing order out of chaos.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree Roger. I would add to this understanding however, a logarithmic
>>> sense of increasing quality of experience.
>>>
>>> human experience = consciousness > animal experience = awareness >
>>> microbiotic experience = sensation > inorganic experience = persistence of
>>> functions and structures.
>>>
>>> I would not say producing order out of chaos because I think that chaos
>>> is not primordial. Nonsense is a mismatch or attenuation of sense, not the
>>> other way around. Order cannot be produced from chaos unless chaos
>>> implicitly contains the potential for order...which makes the production of
>>> orderly appearance really just a formality.
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Alberto.
>>
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>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
> --
> Alberto.
>
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Alberto.
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