On Thursday, October 11, 2012 9:14:25 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
> Hi Craig Weinberg
> A whole man has a monad called, let's say, John Doe.
In this case I would call 'having a monad', 'being a person' who identifies
with the name John Doe (and I would say that the name define or influences
the person to some extent as well). There is no separate thing from the
experience of being this person. Your entire life experience *is* the
monad, which is itself a version of the cosmological monad in miniature
(miniature only relative to all of the other grander monad divisions).
> That's the unchanging identity of his soul= monad.
The only aspect that is unchanging is the private narrative continuity of
presence, which doesn't have anything to change into since it is the event
or occasion of your lifetime as a whole. It is made of time, not a
> Technically a man's soul is called a spirit by L,
> but I just use soul to avoid confusion.
Spirit and soul fail to me because they imply a kind of gaseous form in
space or a halo or something. While some sensitives may be able to see
non-ordinary qualities when looking at someone, auras, etc, this doesn't
mean to me that these images are anything but more subtle appearances of
our body. They still aren't 'us' - nothing is us, except us.
> Within John's monad=soul is a homunculus
> that has its own homunculus mind that
> represents his actual physical brain.
> At the present time I don't understand how to
> break that down into neurons etc.
Nah, The brain is the public view of part of the person, that's all. The
part which is the bottleneck for the experiences of the sub-personal
experiences of the body and the super-personal experiences of being a
member of society. It's the impersonal public view of a person's dashboard
for their own body. There's no homunculus, no conversion, no breaking down
into anything. Neuron activities are the shadows of sub-personal
experiences. A brain's activity as a whole over a lifetime is the shadow of
a person's life. Not exactly a shadow because you can manipulate the brain
with consequences to the person, but nevertheless, the person is the 'head
end' of the total package and the body is the 'tail end'.
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Craig Weinberg
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-10, 14:47:15
> Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls
> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 2:32:40 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons..
> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences.
> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary.
> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that.
> Names are not important.
> I agree that the names aren't important, but why are there two different
> unrelated kinds of experiences? Do the monads make the neurons, and if so,
> why? Or do the neurons make monads, and again, why? If you have either one,
> why have the other?
> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
> >> Craig,
> >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
> >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
> >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
> >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
> >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
> > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I
> > that what you are describing would be technically categorized as
> > interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed
> to be
> > two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that
> > doesn't...bleed?
> > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29)
> >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
> >> monads..
> >> For example take the binding problem where:
> >> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different
> >> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single
> >> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each
> >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
> >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc
> >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
> >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
> >> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial
> >> location"
> >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
> > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only
> > to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually
> > suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The
> > hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'?
> >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
> >> because of the BEC entanglement connection.
> >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
> >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
> >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
> >> perhaps to solve the binding problem
> >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
> > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and
> > neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in
> > we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human
> > consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum
> > framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this
> > capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble
> > perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring
> > experiencer?
> > Craig
> >> Richard
> > --
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