Hi Richard Ruquist  

Only the path is warped. If there's anything in it, it
will be accordingly displaced.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/11/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-11, 08:17:23 
Subject: Re: Impossible connections 


Spacetime could not be warped if it were a void. 

On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
> I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that 
> Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his 
> conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or 
> manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, 
> then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of 
> private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public 
> bodies. 
> 
> Craig 
> 
> PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where 
> Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but 
> figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. 
> 
> On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
>> 
>> Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. 
>> Richard 
>> 
>> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
>> > Hi Richard Ruquist 
>> > 
>> > Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. 
>> > The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible 
>> > between ideas and things. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 
>> > 10/11/2012 
>> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> > From: Richard Ruquist 
>> > Receiver: everything-list 
>> > Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 
>> > Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Craig, 
>> > The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. 
>> > I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. 
>> > But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. 
>> > The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. 
>> > Names are not important. 
>> > Richard 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> Craig, 
>> >>> 
>> >>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the 
>> >>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if 
>> >>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then 
>> >>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. 
>> >>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I 
>> >> think 
>> >> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as 
>> >> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed 
>> >> to be 
>> >> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that 
>> >> doesn't...bleed? 
>> >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory 
>> >>> monads.. 
>> >>> 
>> >>> For example take the binding problem where: 
>> >>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different 
>> >>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single 
>> >>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each 
>> >>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) 
>> >>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc 
>> >>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), 
>> >>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for 
>> >>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial 
>> >>> location" 
>> >>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: 
>> >>> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>> >>>  
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only 
>> >> tries 
>> >> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually 
>> >> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. 
>> >> The 
>> >> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things 
>> >>> because of the BEC entanglement connection. 
>> >>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory 
>> >>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness 
>> >>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads 
>> >>> perhaps to solve the binding problem 
>> >>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. 
>> >> 
>> >> 
>> >> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and 
>> >> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in 
>> >> what 
>> >> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human 
>> >> consciousness being instantiated by a particular 
>> >> neuroscientific-quantum 
>> >> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this 
>> >> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule 
>> >> ensemble 
>> >> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring 
>> >> an 
>> >> experiencer? 
>> >> 
>> >> Craig 
>> >> 
>> >>> 
>> >>> Richard 
>> >>> 
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