Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is.
Richard

On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Richard Ruquist
>
> Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas.
> The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible
> between ideas and things.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/11/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Richard Ruquist
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39
> Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls
>
>
> Craig,
> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons..
> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences.
> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary.
> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that.
> Names are not important.
> Richard
>
>
> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>>
>>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
>>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
>>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
>>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
>>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
>>
>>
>> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think
>> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as
>> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be
>> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that
>> doesn't...bleed?
>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29)
>>
>>>
>>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
>>> monads..
>>>
>>> For example take the binding problem where:
>>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different
>>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single
>>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each
>>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
>>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc
>>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
>>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
>>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial
>>> location"
>>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
>>>
>>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>>
>>
>> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries
>> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually
>> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The
>> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'?
>>
>>>
>>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
>>> because of the BEC entanglement connection.
>>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
>>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
>>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
>>> perhaps to solve the binding problem
>>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
>>
>>
>> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and
>> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what
>> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human
>> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum
>> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this
>> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble
>> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an
>> experiencer?
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>>
>>> Richard
>>>
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