Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. > The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible > between ideas and things. > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/11/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 > Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls > > > Craig, > The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. > I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. > But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. > The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. > Names are not important. > Richard > > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >>> >>> Craig, >>> >>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. >> >> >> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think >> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as >> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be >> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that >> doesn't...bleed? >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) >> >>> >>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >>> monads.. >>> >>> For example take the binding problem where: >>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >>> location" >>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >>> >>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) >> >> >> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries >> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually >> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The >> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? >> >>> >>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >>> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >>> perhaps to solve the binding problem >>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. >> >> >> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and >> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what >> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human >> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum >> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this >> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble >> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an >> experiencer? >> >> Craig >> >>> >>> Richard >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >
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