Hi Craig Weinberg L speaking here:
Every corporeal body without parts in the universe is also a monad. Bodies of more than one part have a monad for each part. Every monad is alive to various degrees, hence various forms of vitalism, and to various degrees have intellect (intelligence), feeling (sensory stuff) and body (a meaty or material part) so the entire universe is alive in various degrees. Rocks only have body monads and are considered to be somewhat as in a coma. These objects in monad form are all nonlocal, since monads are outside of spacetime, so they share intellects, feeling, and bodily feelings to a limited extent, always distorted and always limited in their field of view. They can also see a little into the future, acccording to their capabilities. While that may sound magical, the actual corporeal bodies are your everyday corporeal bodies, show no more signs of life than nature shows you. No magic involved. Bounce a ball, eat a cake, etc. Roger Clough, [email protected] 10/11/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-10, 15:45:10 Subject: Re: Survey of Consciousness Models On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following: > http://s33light.org/post/33296583824 > > Have a look. Objections? Suggestions? > I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness. Yeah, this is more of an informal consideration of the breakpoints between awareness and matter. I bring in vitalism as a name for the breakpoint which is assigned to biology as far as being the difference between what can evolve awareness and what never can. Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not. I wasn't really talking about epiphenomenalism, I was saying that eliminativism treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Or are you saying that eliminativism eliminates even the concept of consciousness as an experience - which yeah, maybe it does, even though it really doesn't even make sense unless the inside of our brain looked like a Cartesian theater. Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they just do not have causal power on human behavior. Yeah, I see epiphenomenalism as a principle which could be attached to a lot of the ones that I listed. You could have epiphenomenal idealism if you believe that it is 'all God's Will', or whatever. It isn't really in the same category as what I was after here in looking at where the breakpoints are. Like substance dualism, it is just saying what consciousness is not but offers no explanation about what it is. Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is subtle. Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't? There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism. Externalism is a good one that I should add maybe. It still doesn't point to who gets to be conscious and who doesn't though. Property dualism, like Substance dualism seems like it could be attached to several of the others. It doesn't really specify at what level the property of consciousness kicks in. You will find nice podcasts about it at A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind Thanks! Will check em out when I can! Craig Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/WWH98ZJcPTIJ. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
