Hi Richard Ruquist  

He didn't in so many words, you have to study his philosophy. 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/11/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-11, 10:16:43 
Subject: Re: On monads and vitalism 


Roger, 

Could you supply a link to where L said all that. Google is unable to 
find any such place. 
Richard 

On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
> Hi Craig Weinberg 
> 
> L speaking here: 
> 
> Every corporeal body without parts in the 
> universe is also a monad. Bodies of more than 
> one part have a monad for each part. 
> 
> Every monad is alive to various degrees, hence 
> various forms of vitalism, and to various degrees 
> have intellect (intelligence), feeling (sensory stuff) 
> and body (a meaty or material part) so the entire universe 
> is alive in various degrees. Rocks only have body monads 
> and are considered to be somewhat as in a coma. 
> 
> These objects in monad form are all nonlocal, since monads are outside 
> of spacetime, so they share intellects, feeling, and 
> bodily feelings to a limited extent, always distorted 
> and always limited in their field of view. They can also 
> see a little into the future, acccording to their capabilities. 
> 
> While that may sound magical, the actual corporeal 
> bodies are your everyday corporeal bodies, show 
> no more signs of life than nature shows you. 
> No magic involved. Bounce a ball, eat a cake, etc. 
> 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/11/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Craig Weinberg 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-10, 15:45:10 
> Subject: Re: Survey of Consciousness Models 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: 
> On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following: 
>> http://s33light.org/post/33296583824 
>> 
>> Have a look. Objections? Suggestions? 
>> 
> 
> I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness. 
> 
> 
> Yeah, this is more of an informal consideration of the breakpoints between 
> awareness and matter. I bring in vitalism as a name for the breakpoint which 
> is assigned to biology as far as being the difference between what can evolve 
> awareness and what never can. 
> 
> 
> 
> Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that 
> epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not. 
> 
> 
> I wasn't really talking about epiphenomenalism, I was saying that 
> eliminativism treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Or are you saying 
> that eliminativism eliminates even the concept of consciousness as an 
> experience - which yeah, maybe it does, even though it really doesn't even 
> make sense unless the inside of our brain looked like a Cartesian theater. 
> 
> 
> Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they 
> just do not have causal power on human behavior. 
> 
> 
> Yeah, I see epiphenomenalism as a principle which could be attached to a lot 
> of the ones that I listed. You could have epiphenomenal idealism if you 
> believe that it is 'all God's Will', or whatever. It isn't really in the same 
> category as what I was after here in looking at where the breakpoints are. 
> Like substance dualism, it is just saying what consciousness is not but 
> offers no explanation about what it is. 
> 
> 
> 
> Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to 
> physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes 
> through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is 
> subtle. 
> 
> 
> Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't? 
> 
> 
> 
> There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism. 
> 
> 
> Externalism is a good one that I should add maybe. It still doesn't point to 
> who gets to be conscious and who doesn't though. Property dualism, like 
> Substance dualism seems like it could be attached to several of the others. 
> It doesn't really specify at what level the property of consciousness kicks 
> in. 
> 
> 
> 
> You will find nice podcasts about it at 
> 
> A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind 
> http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind 
> 
> 
> Thanks! Will check em out when I can! 
> 
> Craig 
> 
> 
> 
> Evgenii 
> -- 
> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html 
> 
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