Roger,

Could you supply a link to where L said all that. Google is unable to
find any such place.
Richard

On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Craig Weinberg
>
> L speaking here:
>
> Every corporeal body without parts in the
> universe is also a monad.  Bodies of more than
> one part have a monad for each part.
>
> Every monad is alive to various degrees, hence
> various forms of vitalism, and to various degrees
> have intellect (intelligence), feeling (sensory stuff)
> and body (a meaty or material part) so the entire universe
> is alive in various degrees. Rocks only have body monads
> and are considered to be somewhat as in a coma.
>
> These objects in monad form are all nonlocal, since monads are outside
> of spacetime, so they share intellects, feeling, and
> bodily feelings to a limited extent, always distorted
> and always limited in their field of view. They can also
> see a little into the future, acccording to their capabilities.
>
> While that may sound magical, the actual corporeal
> bodies are your everyday corporeal bodies, show
> no more signs of life than nature shows you.
> No magic involved. Bounce a  ball, eat a cake, etc.
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/11/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Craig Weinberg
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-10, 15:45:10
> Subject: Re: Survey of Consciousness Models
>
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
>> http://s33light.org/post/33296583824
>>
>> Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
>>
>
> I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.
>
>
> Yeah, this is more of an informal consideration of the breakpoints between 
> awareness and matter. I bring in vitalism as a name for the breakpoint which 
> is assigned to biology as far as being the difference between what can evolve 
> awareness and what never can.
>
>
>
> Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
> epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
>
>
> I wasn't really talking about epiphenomenalism, I was saying that 
> eliminativism treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Or are you saying 
> that eliminativism eliminates even the concept of consciousness as an 
> experience - which yeah, maybe it does, even though it really doesn't even 
> make sense unless the inside of our brain looked like a Cartesian theater.
>
>
> Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they
> just do not have causal power on human behavior.
>
>
> Yeah, I see epiphenomenalism as a principle which could be attached to a lot 
> of the ones that I listed. You could have epiphenomenal idealism if you 
> believe that it is 'all God's Will', or whatever. It isn't really in the same 
> category as what I was after here in looking at where the breakpoints are. 
> Like substance dualism, it is just saying what consciousness is not but 
> offers no explanation about what it is.
>
>
>
> Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to
> physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes
> through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is
> subtle.
>
>
> Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't?
>
>
>
> There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.
>
>
> Externalism is a good one that I should add maybe. It still doesn't point to 
> who gets to be conscious and who doesn't though. Property dualism, like 
> Substance dualism seems like it could be attached to several of the others. 
> It doesn't really specify at what level the property of consciousness kicks 
> in.
>
>
>
> You will find nice podcasts about it at
>
> A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
> http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind
>
>
> Thanks! Will check em out when I can!
>
> Craig
>
>
>
> Evgenii
> --
> http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html
>
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