Roger, Could you supply a link to where L said all that. Google is unable to find any such place. Richard
On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Craig Weinberg > > L speaking here: > > Every corporeal body without parts in the > universe is also a monad. Bodies of more than > one part have a monad for each part. > > Every monad is alive to various degrees, hence > various forms of vitalism, and to various degrees > have intellect (intelligence), feeling (sensory stuff) > and body (a meaty or material part) so the entire universe > is alive in various degrees. Rocks only have body monads > and are considered to be somewhat as in a coma. > > These objects in monad form are all nonlocal, since monads are outside > of spacetime, so they share intellects, feeling, and > bodily feelings to a limited extent, always distorted > and always limited in their field of view. They can also > see a little into the future, acccording to their capabilities. > > While that may sound magical, the actual corporeal > bodies are your everyday corporeal bodies, show > no more signs of life than nature shows you. > No magic involved. Bounce a ball, eat a cake, etc. > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/11/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Craig Weinberg > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-10, 15:45:10 > Subject: Re: Survey of Consciousness Models > > > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:27:52 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following: >> http://s33light.org/post/33296583824 >> >> Have a look. Objections? Suggestions? >> > > I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness. > > > Yeah, this is more of an informal consideration of the breakpoints between > awareness and matter. I bring in vitalism as a name for the breakpoint which > is assigned to biology as far as being the difference between what can evolve > awareness and what never can. > > > > Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that > epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not. > > > I wasn't really talking about epiphenomenalism, I was saying that > eliminativism treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon. Or are you saying > that eliminativism eliminates even the concept of consciousness as an > experience - which yeah, maybe it does, even though it really doesn't even > make sense unless the inside of our brain looked like a Cartesian theater. > > > Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they > just do not have causal power on human behavior. > > > Yeah, I see epiphenomenalism as a principle which could be attached to a lot > of the ones that I listed. You could have epiphenomenal idealism if you > believe that it is 'all God's Will', or whatever. It isn't really in the same > category as what I was after here in looking at where the breakpoints are. > Like substance dualism, it is just saying what consciousness is not but > offers no explanation about what it is. > > > > Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to > physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes > through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is > subtle. > > > Too subtle for me maybe. What does one say that the other doesn't? > > > > There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism. > > > Externalism is a good one that I should add maybe. It still doesn't point to > who gets to be conscious and who doesn't though. Property dualism, like > Substance dualism seems like it could be attached to several of the others. > It doesn't really specify at what level the property of consciousness kicks > in. > > > > You will find nice podcasts about it at > > A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind > http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind > > > Thanks! Will check em out when I can! > > Craig > > > > Evgenii > -- > http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/WWH98ZJcPTIJ. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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