On 10 Oct 2012, at 21:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
http://s33light.org/post/33296583824
Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?
I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.
Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that
epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not.
Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they
just do not have causal power on human behavior.
Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to
physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes
through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism
is subtle.
There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.
You will find nice podcasts about it at
Most assume, without knowing, more infinities in both matter and comp,
than the infinities Turing recoverable by the machines in her first
person perspective on arithmetic.
Still Aristotelian. Perhaps one of them is correct (certainly not
eliminativism, I think), but none are logically and epistemologically
compatible with the quite weak form of computationalism we can use in
cognitive science.
You have to come back to Plotinus and Pythagoras, or to listen to
mystic or to study computer science and arithmetic to see this. Such
view still take a primary universe for granted. Some don't believe in
a creator, but they still believe in a creation.
With comp it is more like an open problem. Even if a creation
eventually exists, it can only exists in virtue of gluing, in some
equivocal manner, all universal dreams. But QM already rise doubts on
such a possible universal equivocal selection.
Bruno
A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind
Evgenii
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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html
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