On 10 Oct 2012, at 21:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following:
http://s33light.org/post/33296583824

Have a look. Objections? Suggestions?


I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness.

Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not. Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they just do not have causal power on human behavior.

Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is subtle.

There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism.

You will find nice podcasts about it at



Most assume, without knowing, more infinities in both matter and comp, than the infinities Turing recoverable by the machines in her first person perspective on arithmetic.

Still Aristotelian. Perhaps one of them is correct (certainly not eliminativism, I think), but none are logically and epistemologically compatible with the quite weak form of computationalism we can use in cognitive science.

You have to come back to Plotinus and Pythagoras, or to listen to mystic or to study computer science and arithmetic to see this. Such view still take a primary universe for granted. Some don't believe in a creator, but they still believe in a creation.

With comp it is more like an open problem. Even if a creation eventually exists, it can only exists in virtue of gluing, in some equivocal manner, all universal dreams. But QM already rise doubts on such a possible universal equivocal selection.

Bruno




A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind
http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/romp-through-philosophy-mind

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/philosophy-of-mind.html

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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