# Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if"ratherthan"is"

```Dear Stephen,
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On 16 Oct 2012, at 16:03, Stephen P. King wrote:

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```On 10/16/2012 9:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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```On 15 Oct 2012, at 16:14, Roger Clough wrote:

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```Hi Craig Weinberg

After looking at how computers make choices--
whether they are free or whatever-- I now see
that my previous position that computers have
no intelligence was not exactly right, because
they do have intelligence,  but it is different
from ours.  It is not free exactly but free to
act as long as it obeys reason.
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```
Even ideal machines driven by reason have to face their irrationality when looking inward.
```
Bruno
```
```Dear Bruno,

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I think this sentence of yours is in a deep sense wrong. We or ideal machines can never see or discover with only self-inspection or self-interviewing their own inconsistency!
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That is weird. If we are inconsistent, we can discover it. All what is needed is a proof of "0=1" from our beliefs. And that proof will exist, if we are truly inconsistent, and can be found as it is a *finite* object.
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That happens often, and is a basis of the learning process.

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It would be an automatic solution of the solipsism problem (and your arithmetic body problem!) if true!
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?

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```We can only see our inconsistencies from reports of "other minds".
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If we are consistent, we cannot prove that we are consistent.

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But if we are inconsistent, we can prove that we are inconsistent (we can even prove that we are also consistent, as we can prove A and ~A for all statements A).
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Other minds can help but are not necessary. A pilot can crash his plane even if alone in the plane.
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The relation between G and G* in comp seems to indicate this idea... (unless I completely misunderstand it.)
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```
You confuse apparently p -> q, with ~p -> ~q. Or you believe that consistent and inconsistent have symmetrical roles, which they don't.
```
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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