On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:00, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 8:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:02:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

There is of course the idea that the universe is actually a simulation but that is more controversial.

A tempting idea until we question what it is a simulation of?

We can close this by considering when is a simulation of a "real thing" indistinguishable from the "real thing"!

What law states that computations exist ab initio, but the capacity to experience and participate in a simulated world does not?

    Good point! Why not both existing ab initio?

But they exists ab initio in the arithmetical truth. So with comp, we can postulate only the numbers, or the computations (they are ontologically equivalent), then consciousness is semantical fixed point, existing for arithmetical reason, yet not describable in direct arithmetical term (like truth, by Tarski, or knowledge by Scott- Montague. The Theaetetical "Bp & p" is very appealing in that setting, as it is not arithmetically definable, yet makes sense in purely arithmetical term for each p in the language of the machine (arithmetic, say).

So we don't have to postulate consciousness to explain why machine will correctly believe in, and develop discourse about, some truth that they can know, and that they can also know them to be non justifiable, non sharable, and possibly invariant for digital self- transformation, etc.

Bruno





--
Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to