On 18/10/2012, at 4:12 AM, "Roger Clough" <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception
> is a hypothetical being
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks
> conscious experience, qualia, or sentience. When a zombie is poked with a
> sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the
> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it
> has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the
> first part of this sentence.
So if you met a computer that behaved in a human-like way you would assume that
it had a mind?
-- Stathis Papaioannou
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