Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more relevant list-post sometimes.
You wrote about the U-M: *"...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions..."* ** I would be cautios with "all" since we know only SOME. I plead ignorance to the difference of a Loeb and another type(?) Univ. Machine. Is the Leobian restricted? In what sense? BTW: What is 'universal'? I would think twice to deem something as *"... it might be intrinsically complex..."* ** *EVERYTHING* is intrinsically (too!) complex. We just take simplified versions - adjusted to OUR mindful capabilities. *"intelligence vs competence"?* ** The 'oldies' (from yesterday back to the Greeks/Indians etc.) were 'competent' in the actual (then) inventory of the knowledge base of their time. That gave their 'intelligence' (the way I defined it) so: no controversy. *Bohm* discussed with Krishnamurty before his association in London with Hiley. The posthumous book the latter wrote in their combined(?) authorship includes Bohm's earlier physical stances (~1952) even before his Brazilian escape. I do not accuse Hiley of improperness, but he left out all the Krishnamurtian mystique embraced by Bohm. Granted: Bohm taught later advanced physical science in London but as far as I know never went back on his interim (call it: metaphysical?) philosophy. John M On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 2:19 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > John, > > On 09 Oct 2012, at 22:22, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno, > examples are not identifiction. I was referring to (your?) lack of > detailed description what the universal machine consists of and how it > functions (maybe: beyond what we know - ha ha). A comprehensive ID. Your > "lot of examples" rather denies that you have one. > > > A universal machine is any entity capable of computing all partial > computable functions. There are many, and for many we can prove that they > are universal machine. For many we can't prove that, or it might be > intrinsically complex to do so. > > A Löbian machine is a universal machine which "knows", in a weak technical > precise sense, that they are universal. > > Same remark as above, we can prove that some machine are Löbian, but we > might not been able to recognize all those who are. > > > > And: > 'if it is enough FOR YOU to consider them," it may not be enough for me. I > don't really know HOW conscious I am. > > > Nor do I. Nor do they, when you listened to them, taking into account > their silence. > > > > I like your counter-point in competence and intelligence. > I identified the "wisdom" (maybe it should read: the intelligence) of the > oldies as not 'disturbed' by too many factual(?) known circumstances - > maybe it is competence. > > > You meant "intelligence"? I would agree. > > You know I prefer the Bohm who discuss with Krishnamurti, than the Bohm > (the same person to be sure) who believes in quantum hidden variables. > > > To include our inventory accumulated over the millennia as impediment > ('blinded by'). > > > Above the Löbian treshold, the machine understands that, the more she > know, the more she is ignorant. > > Knowledge is only a lantern on a very big unknown. The more light you put > on it, the bigger it seems. > > But we can ask question (= develop theories). And we can have experiences. > > > Above the Löbian treshold, the machine understands that the more she can > be intelligent, the more she can be stupid. > > And that competence is quite relative, but can be magnified uncomputably, > but also (alas) unpredictably, with many simple heuristics, like: > > - tolerate errors, > - work in union, > - encourage changes of mind, > > etc. (By results of Case and Smith, Blum and Blum, Gold, Putnam, etc.). > reference in the biblio of "conscience et mécanisme", in my url. > > Bruno > > > > > > John M > > On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 11:01 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:07, John Mikes wrote: >> >> Dear Richard, "I think" the lengthy text is Ben's article in response to >>> D. Deutsch. >>> Sometimes I was erring in the belief that it is YOUR text, but no. >>> Thanks for copying. >>> It is too long and too little organized for me to keep up with >>> ramifications prima vista. >>> What I extracted from it are some remarks I will try to communicate to >>> Ben (a longtime e-mail friend) as well. >>> >>> I have my (agnostically derived) version of intelligence: the capability >>> of reading 'inter' >>> lines (words/meanings). Apart from such human distinction: to realize >>> the 'essence' of relations beyond vocabulary, or 'physical science' >>> definitions. >>> Such content is not provided in our practical computing machines >>> (although Bruno trans-leaps such barriers with his (Löb's) universal >>> machine unidentified). >>> >> >> >> Unidentified? I give a lot of examples: PA, ZF, John Mikes, me, and >> the octopus. >> >> In some sense they succeed enough the mirror test. That's enough for me >> to consider them, well, not just conscious, but as conscious as me, and you. >> The difference are only on domain competence, and intelligence (in which >> case it might be that octopus are more intelligent than us, as we are >> blinded by our competences). >> >> It is possible that when competence grows intelligence decrease, but I am >> not sure. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> Whatever our (physical) machines can do is within the physical limits >>> of information - the content of the actual "MODEL" of the world we live >>> with by yesterday's knowledge, no advanced technology can transcend such >>> limitations: there is no input to do so. This may be the limits for AI, and >>> AGI as well. Better manipulation etc. do not go BEYOND. >>> >>> Human mind-capabilities, however, (at least in my 'agnostic' worldview) >>> are under the influences (unspecified) from the infinite complexity BEYOND >>> our MODEL, without our knowledge and specification's power. Accordingly we >>> MAY get input from more than the factual content of the MODEL. On such >>> (unspecified) influences may be our creativity based (anticipation of >>> Robert Rosen?) what cannot be duplicated by cutest algorithms in the best >>> computing machines. >>> Our 'factual' knowable in the MODEL are adjusted to our mind's >>> capability - not so even the input from the unknowable 'infinite >>> complexity's' relations. >>> >>> Intelligence would go beyond our quotidian limitations, not feasible for >>> machines that work within such borders. >>> >>> I may dig out relevant information from Ben's text in subsequent >>> readings, provided that I get to it back. >>> >>> >>> Thanks again, it was a very interesting scroll-down >>> >>> John Mikes >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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