Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the
listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more
relevant list-post sometimes.

You wrote about the U-M:
*"...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions..."*
**
I would be cautios with "all" since we know only SOME.
I plead ignorance to the difference of a Loeb and another type(?) Univ.
Machine. Is the Leobian restricted? In what sense? BTW: What is
'universal'?
I would think twice to deem something as

*"... it might be intrinsically complex..."*
**
*EVERYTHING* is intrinsically (too!) complex. We just take simplified
versions - adjusted to OUR mindful capabilities.

*"intelligence vs competence"?*
**
The 'oldies' (from yesterday back to the Greeks/Indians etc.) were
'competent' in the actual (then) inventory of the knowledge base of their
time. That gave their 'intelligence' (the way I defined it) so: no
controversy.

*Bohm* discussed with Krishnamurty before his association in London with
Hiley. The posthumous book the latter wrote in their combined(?) authorship
includes Bohm's earlier physical stances (~1952)  even before his Brazilian
escape.
I do not accuse Hiley of improperness, but he left out all the
Krishnamurtian mystique embraced by Bohm. Granted: Bohm taught later
advanced physical science in London but as far as I know never went back on
his interim (call it: metaphysical?) philosophy.

John M



On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 2:19 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> John,
>
>  On 09 Oct 2012, at 22:22, John Mikes wrote:
>
>  Bruno,
> examples are not identifiction. I was referring to (your?) lack of
> detailed description what the universal machine consists of and how it
> functions (maybe: beyond what we know - ha ha). A comprehensive ID. Your
> "lot of examples" rather denies that you have one.
>
>
> A universal machine is any entity capable of computing all partial
> computable functions. There are many, and for many we can prove that they
> are universal machine. For many we can't prove that, or it might be
> intrinsically complex to do so.
>
> A Löbian machine is a universal machine which "knows", in a weak technical
> precise sense, that they are universal.
>
> Same remark as above, we can prove that some machine are Löbian, but we
> might not been able to recognize all those who are.
>
>
>
>  And:
> 'if it is enough FOR YOU to consider them," it may not be enough for me. I
> don't really know HOW conscious I am.
>
>
> Nor do I. Nor do they, when you listened to them, taking into account
> their silence.
>
>
>
> I like your  counter-point in competence and intelligence.
> I identified the "wisdom" (maybe it should read: the intelligence) of the
> oldies as not 'disturbed' by too many factual(?) known circumstances -
> maybe it is competence.
>
>
> You meant "intelligence"? I would agree.
>
> You know I prefer the Bohm who discuss with Krishnamurti, than the Bohm
> (the same person to be sure) who believes in quantum hidden variables.
>
>
>  To include our inventory accumulated over the millennia as impediment
> ('blinded by').
>
>
> Above the Löbian treshold, the machine understands that, the more she
> know, the more she is ignorant.
>
> Knowledge is only a lantern on a very big unknown. The more light you put
> on it, the bigger it seems.
>
> But we can ask question (= develop theories). And we can have experiences.
>
>
> Above the Löbian treshold, the machine understands that the more she can
> be intelligent, the more she can be stupid.
>
> And that competence is quite relative, but can be magnified uncomputably,
> but also (alas) unpredictably, with many simple heuristics, like:
>
> - tolerate errors,
> - work in union,
> - encourage changes of mind,
>
> etc.  (By results of Case and Smith, Blum and Blum, Gold, Putnam, etc.).
> reference in the biblio of "conscience et mécanisme", in my url.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> John M
>
> On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 11:01 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:07, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> Dear Richard, "I think" the lengthy text is Ben's article in response to
>>> D. Deutsch.
>>> Sometimes I was erring in the belief that it is YOUR text, but no.
>>> Thanks for copying.
>>> It is too long and too little organized for me to keep up with
>>> ramifications prima vista.
>>> What I extracted from it are some remarks I will try to communicate to
>>> Ben (a longtime e-mail friend) as well.
>>>
>>> I have my (agnostically derived) version of intelligence: the capability
>>> of reading 'inter'
>>> lines (words/meanings). Apart from such human distinction: to realize
>>> the 'essence' of relations beyond vocabulary, or 'physical science'
>>> definitions.
>>> Such content is not provided in our practical computing machines
>>> (although Bruno trans-leaps such barriers with his (Löb's) universal
>>> machine unidentified).
>>>
>>
>>
>> Unidentified?    I give a lot of  examples: PA, ZF, John Mikes, me, and
>> the octopus.
>>
>> In some sense they succeed enough the mirror test. That's enough for me
>> to consider them, well, not just conscious, but as conscious as me, and you.
>> The difference are only on domain competence, and intelligence (in which
>> case it might be that octopus are more intelligent than us, as we are
>> blinded by our competences).
>>
>> It is possible that when competence grows intelligence decrease, but I am
>> not sure.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>  Whatever our (physical) machines can do is within the physical limits
>>> of information - the content of the actual "MODEL" of the world we live
>>> with by yesterday's knowledge, no advanced technology can transcend such
>>> limitations: there is no input to do so. This may be the limits for AI, and
>>> AGI as well. Better manipulation etc. do not go BEYOND.
>>>
>>> Human mind-capabilities, however, (at least in my 'agnostic' worldview)
>>> are under the influences (unspecified) from the infinite complexity BEYOND
>>> our MODEL, without our knowledge and specification's power. Accordingly we
>>> MAY get input from more than the factual content of the MODEL. On such
>>> (unspecified) influences may be our creativity based (anticipation of
>>> Robert Rosen?) what cannot be duplicated by cutest algorithms in the best
>>> computing machines.
>>> Our 'factual' knowable in the MODEL are adjusted to our mind's
>>> capability - not so even the input from the unknowable 'infinite
>>> complexity's' relations.
>>>
>>> Intelligence would go beyond our quotidian limitations, not feasible for
>>> machines that work within such borders.
>>>
>>> I may dig out relevant information from Ben's text in subsequent
>>> readings, provided that I get to it back.
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks again, it was a very interesting scroll-down
>>>
>>> John Mikes
>>>
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>>
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