On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:44, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno:
you got me.
I wrote about things we cannot know - we have no capability to think of it - and you deny that based on products of the human mind (math - logic) saying YES, we can know everything (that we or our products DO know).

I am sorry John, but this is unclear, and a bit out of the context, so I can't figure out what I was saying. But once we bet we are machine, we can definitely know some things and be sure the machine cannot know, as we derive a contradiction from it. We cannot know everything about reality, nor even what is reality, we can still propose theoreis and reason in such theories.



You claimed to be agnostic ("more than myself") - now I don't see it.
*
As I stated: Bohm never went back to his metaphysical ideas while in London and Hiley - posthumusly - composed their book upon this (London) period, so you I doubt whether you can read anything in THAT book -


I was mentioning his conversation with Krishnamurti.


Bruno





On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 21 Oct 2012, at 23:46, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more relevant list-post sometimes.

You wrote about the U-M:
"...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions..."

I would be cautios with "all" since we know only SOME.

Not with Church Thesis (CT). It is here that a "miracle occur". For all notion of "all" in mathematics, we can refute the universality pretension by a tool known as diagonalisation. But there is one exception: the notion of computation, which seems (and "is" with CT) close for the diagonalization. this is how, mainly, the mathematical discovery of the universal machine arrived.





I plead ignorance to the difference of a Loeb and another type(?) Univ. Machine. Is the Leobian restricted?

In logic; restriction on the axioms leads to unrestriction of the models. and vice versa. Loebian machines are

- universal (for computability)
- they have the cognitive ability to know (in some sense) that they are universal (and thus they know that they are infinitely ignorant, even if only with respect to the arithmetical truth).

They have less models, but more knowledge, which of course lessen the models.






In what sense? BTW: What is 'universal'?
I would think twice to deem something as

It is a precise mathematical notion, and it correspond indeed to what computers are, but also, brain, cells, etc. Even without comp (comp assume that brain cells are not more than universal, at some level).






"... it might be intrinsically complex..."

EVERYTHING is intrinsically (too!) complex. We just take simplified versions - adjusted to OUR mindful capabilities.

"intelligence vs competence"?

The 'oldies' (from yesterday back to the Greeks/Indians etc.) were 'competent' in the actual (then) inventory of the knowledge base of their time. That gave their 'intelligence' (the way I defined it) so: no controversy.

Bohm discussed with Krishnamurty before his association in London with Hiley. The posthumous book the latter wrote in their combined(?) authorship includes Bohm's earlier physical stances (~1952) even before his Brazilian escape. I do not accuse Hiley of improperness, but he left out all the Krishnamurtian mystique embraced by Bohm. Granted: Bohm taught later advanced physical science in London but as far as I know never went back on his interim (call it: metaphysical?) philosophy.

I should certainly reread this. Want to comment, but I am not sure, need to reread some part. I will see.

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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