Bruno:
you got me.
I wrote about things we cannot know - we have no capability to think of it
- and you deny that based on products of the human mind (math - logic)
saying YES, we can know everything (that we or our products DO know).
You claimed to be agnostic ("more than myself") - now I don't see it.
*
As I stated: Bohm never went back to his metaphysical ideas while in London
and Hiley - posthumusly - composed their book upon this (London) period, so
you I doubt whether you can read anything in THAT book -
JMOn Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Oct 2012, at 23:46, John Mikes wrote: > > >> Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the >> listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more >> relevant list-post sometimes. >> >> You wrote about the U-M: >> "...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions..." >> >> I would be cautios with "all" since we know only SOME. >> > > Not with Church Thesis (CT). It is here that a "miracle occur". For all > notion of "all" in mathematics, we can refute the universality pretension > by a tool known as diagonalisation. But there is one exception: the notion > of computation, which seems (and "is" with CT) close for the > diagonalization. this is how, mainly, the mathematical discovery of the > universal machine arrived. > > > > > > I plead ignorance to the difference of a Loeb and another type(?) Univ. >> Machine. Is the Leobian restricted? >> > > In logic; restriction on the axioms leads to unrestriction of the models. > and vice versa. Loebian machines are > > - universal (for computability) > - they have the cognitive ability to know (in some sense) that they are > universal (and thus they know that they are infinitely ignorant, even if > only with respect to the arithmetical truth). > > They have less models, but more knowledge, which of course lessen the > models. > > > > > > > In what sense? BTW: What is 'universal'? >> I would think twice to deem something as >> > > It is a precise mathematical notion, and it correspond indeed to what > computers are, but also, brain, cells, etc. Even without comp (comp assume > that brain cells are not more than universal, at some level). > > > > > > >> "... it might be intrinsically complex..." >> >> EVERYTHING is intrinsically (too!) complex. We just take simplified >> versions - adjusted to OUR mindful capabilities. >> >> "intelligence vs competence"? >> >> The 'oldies' (from yesterday back to the Greeks/Indians etc.) were >> 'competent' in the actual (then) inventory of the knowledge base of their >> time. That gave their 'intelligence' (the way I defined it) so: no >> controversy. >> >> Bohm discussed with Krishnamurty before his association in London with >> Hiley. The posthumous book the latter wrote in their combined(?) authorship >> includes Bohm's earlier physical stances (~1952) even before his Brazilian >> escape. >> I do not accuse Hiley of improperness, but he left out all the >> Krishnamurtian mystique embraced by Bohm. Granted: Bohm taught later >> advanced physical science in London but as far as I know never went back on >> his interim (call it: metaphysical?) philosophy. >> > > I should certainly reread this. Want to comment, but I am not sure, need > to reread some part. I will see. > > Bruno > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%[email protected]>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
