Bruno:
you got me.
I wrote about things we cannot know - we have no capability to think of it
- and you deny that based on products of the human mind (math - logic)
saying YES, we can know everything (that we or our products DO know).
You claimed to be agnostic ("more than myself") - now I don't see it.
*
As I stated: Bohm never went back to his metaphysical ideas while in London
and Hiley - posthumusly - composed their book upon this (London) period, so
you I doubt whether you can read anything in THAT book -
JM

On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 21 Oct 2012, at 23:46, John Mikes wrote:
>
>
>> Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the
>> listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more
>> relevant list-post sometimes.
>>
>> You wrote about the U-M:
>> "...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions..."
>>
>> I would be cautios with "all" since we know only SOME.
>>
>
> Not with Church Thesis (CT). It is here that a "miracle occur". For all
> notion of "all" in mathematics, we can refute the universality pretension
> by a tool known as diagonalisation. But there is one exception: the notion
> of computation, which seems (and "is" with CT) close for the
> diagonalization. this is how, mainly, the mathematical discovery of the
> universal machine arrived.
>
>
>
>
>
>  I plead ignorance to the difference of a Loeb and another type(?) Univ.
>> Machine. Is the Leobian restricted?
>>
>
> In logic; restriction on the axioms leads to unrestriction of the models.
> and vice versa. Loebian machines are
>
> - universal (for computability)
> - they have the cognitive ability to know (in some sense) that they are
> universal (and thus they know that they are infinitely ignorant, even if
> only with respect to the arithmetical truth).
>
> They have less models, but more knowledge, which of course lessen the
> models.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  In what sense? BTW: What is 'universal'?
>> I would think twice to deem something as
>>
>
> It is a precise mathematical notion, and it correspond indeed to what
> computers are, but also, brain, cells, etc. Even without comp (comp assume
> that brain cells are not more than universal, at some level).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> "... it might be intrinsically complex..."
>>
>> EVERYTHING is intrinsically (too!) complex. We just take simplified
>> versions - adjusted to OUR mindful capabilities.
>>
>> "intelligence vs competence"?
>>
>> The 'oldies' (from yesterday back to the Greeks/Indians etc.) were
>> 'competent' in the actual (then) inventory of the knowledge base of their
>> time. That gave their 'intelligence' (the way I defined it) so: no
>> controversy.
>>
>> Bohm discussed with Krishnamurty before his association in London with
>> Hiley. The posthumous book the latter wrote in their combined(?) authorship
>> includes Bohm's earlier physical stances (~1952)  even before his Brazilian
>> escape.
>> I do not accuse Hiley of improperness, but he left out all the
>> Krishnamurtian mystique embraced by Bohm. Granted: Bohm taught later
>> advanced physical science in London but as far as I know never went back on
>> his interim (call it: metaphysical?) philosophy.
>>
>
> I should certainly reread this. Want to comment, but I am not sure, need
> to reread some part. I will see.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>
>
>
>
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