Bruno,

I do not find Deutsch's introduction of a rational decision maker convincing
e.g.: http://arxiv.org/ftp/quant-ph/papers/9906/9906015.pdf
nor Wallaces elaboration on that theme
e.g.: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.2718v1.pdf.

My belief is that a rational decision maker, somewhat like a god,
would following Leibniz, always chose the best quantum state in any interaction
to become physical in a single universe. In fact that seems to be exactly what
Wallaces rational decision maker does. I think Deutsch has snookered us all.
Richard

On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 11:28 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>
> On 28 Oct 2012, at 21:01, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno, But it seems that the Gleason Theorem assigns probabilities to
>> the different universes in the multiverse that are not there in
>> Everett's MWI in the first place. Richard
>
>
> ?
> I don't see that, nor why you say so. can you elaborate? Gleason theorem
> just makes unique the usual Born rule, and justify a literal reading of the
> quantum amplitude as relative (infinite) proportions.
> It is quite similar to the Deutsch Hayden justification, in decision
> theoretical terms, of such amplitude reading, in the Heisenberg picture.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Oct 2012, at 15:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
>>>> Well Bruno,
>>>>
>>>> If the "measure problem" (which I take to be the assignment of
>>>> probabilities) is intrinsic to Everett's MWI, does that not amount to
>>>> negating it?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why? I think that it is beautifully solved by Gleason theorem, for the
>>> Hilbert space of dim bigger or equal to 3.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I did not suggest that it negated comp, which is what you
>>>> responded to.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think comp will confirms Everett QM, and this would make our sharable
>>> human or animal substitution level very plausibly at the Heisenberg
>>> uncertainty level, this for surviving even a long run, without detecting
>>> any
>>> difference.
>>>
>>> In that case, the Gleason solution will be the solution for comp. For
>>> this
>>> the X and Z logics (alreeady extracted) must conforms to some desiderata,
>>> already expressed by von Neumann, for a quantum logic, and which is that
>>> mainly it defines the searched measure.
>>>
>>> I m not sure I can understand string theory or any fundamental QM without
>>> Everett.
>>>
>>> I agree that the idea that we are multiplied by infinities at each
>>> instant
>>> is not attractive, but science is not wishful thinking, and besides, I
>>> don't
>>> take any theory too much seriously (we don't know). I also know that
>>> different theories can happen to be equivalent.
>>>
>>> Of course, to be sure, comp has also many attractive features, mainly its
>>> conceptual simplicity and naturalness. It really explains almost why
>>> there
>>> is something instead of nothing, as it assumes only 0 and the successor
>>> and
>>> the very simple laws, and explain from that how that very explanation
>>> emerges in some collection of stable numbers' dream.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Richard
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Richard,
>>>>>
>>>>> On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Doesn't the Gleason Theorem negate MWI by assigning probabilities?
>>>>>> Richard
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On the contrary. Gleason theorem solves the "measure problem" intrinsic
>>>>> in
>>>>> the Everett MWI, it makes the probabilities into comp (or weakening)
>>>>> first
>>>>> person indeterminacies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unfortunately, comp necessitates a version of Gleason theorem for all
>>>>> comp
>>>>> states, not just the quantum one, as the quantum law must be derived
>>>>> from
>>>>> the 1p indeterminacies, occurring in arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>> The advantage is that comp provides the theory of both quanta and
>>>>> qualia
>>>>> (and a whole theology actually).
>>>>> Unfortunately, it is not yet clear if those quanta behave in a
>>>>> sufficiently
>>>>> quantum mechanical way, like making possible quantum computers,
>>>>> hydrogen,
>>>>> strings may be, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:53, meekerdb wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 10/24/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi meekerdb
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the quantum
>>>>>>> wave
>>>>>>> function
>>>>>>> (see below).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
>>>>>>> to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to make
>>>>>>> a measurement).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This leads to ... solipsism. See the work of Abner Shimony.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2) In objective or decoherence theories, some physical
>>>>>>> event (such as using a probe to make a measurement)
>>>>>>> in itself causes decoherence of the wave function. To me,
>>>>>>> this is the simplest and most sensible answer (Occam's Razor).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. It forces some devices
>>>>>>> into
>>>>>>> NOT
>>>>>>> obeying QM.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, it's only inconsistent with a reified interpretation of the wf.
>>>>>>> It's
>>>>>>> perfectly consistent with an instrumentalist interpretation.
>>>>>>> Decoherence
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> a prediction of QM in any interpretation.  It's the einselection
>>>>>>> that's
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> problem.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But instrumentalism is just an abandon of searching knowledge. There
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>> more what, only how.
>>>>>>> An instrumentalist will just not try to answer the question of
>>>>>>> betting
>>>>>>> if
>>>>>>> there is 0, 1, 2, ... omega, ... universes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And the einselection is not a problem at all, in QM + comp. It is
>>>>>>> implied.
>>>>>>> And, imo, the QM corresponding measure problem is solved by Gleason
>>>>>>> theorem
>>>>>>> (basically).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And then, keeping that same 'everything' spirit, the whole QM is
>>>>>>> explained
>>>>>>> by comp. We have just to find the equivalent of "Gleason theorem" for
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> "material hypostases".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3) There is also the many-worlds interpretation, in which collapse
>>>>>>> of the wave is avoided by creating an entire universe.
>>>>>>> This sounds like overkill to me.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is just the result of applying QM to the couple "observer +
>>>>>>> observed".
>>>>>>> It is the literal reading of QM.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So I vote for decoherence of the wave by a probe.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You have to abandon QM, then, and not just QM, but comp too (which
>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>> please you, I guess).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>
>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
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