On 01 Nov 2012, at 14:25, Stephen P. King wrote:

   But I agree with comp up to the strong version of step 8!

But then you have to find the flaw in step 8. as step 8 is done in comp, without adding any assumptions, of course.

I accept comp with a weak version of step 8 or, I think equivalently, a weak version of computational universality: A computation is universal if it is not dependent on any one particular physical system.

This is called functional, not universal. It has nothing to do with Turing universality.

This implies, to me, that there is at least one physical system that such a universal computation can be said to actually run on!

I don't see this.

This goes against the Parmenidean/Platonistic idea of computation as static objects in eternity that are completely independent of physical stuff!

Sorry but, by definition, computations are static objects in arithmetic (or in fortanic, Lispic, combinatoric, lambdaic, etc.... There are a lot of equivalent ontological choices here.).

The physicist have not (yet) found a definition of computation which does not use that mathematical definition. This exists, though, has *many* physical systems are in principle Turing universal. But Turing universal is a mathematical, even arithmetical, (even in the strong logician sense).



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to