On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 1:42 AM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]>wrote:
> On 10/31/2012 6:14 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > > > On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> Dear Cowboy, >> >> One question. Was the general outline that I was trying to explain >> make any sense to you? Without being obvious about it, I am trying to >> finely parse the difference between the logic of temporal systems and the >> logic of atemporal systems - such as the Platonic Realm - such that I might >> show that reasonings that are correct in one are not necessarily correct in >> the other. >> > > This was not obvious to me, and going over the posts, I see how you're > leaning that way... but why not just say that, then? Don't get me wrong, I > love Joycean labyrinths as much as the next guy, but if the topic is on > some level tending towards sincerity, then I don't see the benefit "in not > being obvious". Then again, I'm a Captain Obvious type. Should get the > shirt. > > > Hi Cowboy, > > I am dyslexic, this colors/flavors everything I write.... > > > > >> One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for bringing this up!) >> is that in our reasoning we set up constructions - such as the person on >> the desert island - that blur the very distinction that I am trying to >> frame. We should never assume temporal situations to argue for relations >> that are atemporal unless we are prepared to show the morphisms between the >> two situations. >> >> > Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be arguing for time > as primitive ("n incompatible with comp to begin with, after which you seek > to carve out a distinction, when you've already mixed at the base? > > > My argument is that it is impossible to 'derive" Becoming from Being, > but we can derive Being from Becoming. So why not work with the latter > idea? I am trying to get Bruno to admit, among other things, that he has to > assume a non-well founded logic for his result to work.;-) > > I see less and less how you'd be able to do that, as I said, by making process/linear time primitive in comp, and by assuming physical universe with so many statements. Quantum Logic is part of the picture (see SANE 2004). > > > >> Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a concrete >> robust physical universe". He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would >> demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds >> given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from >> irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, >> 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in an atemporal way. >> > > UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing power, on > memory and print capacities, implying time as some illusion emanating from > eternal primitives, don't exist when framed non-constructively, more like > sets of assignments, rather than operations in your sense, by which you > seem to mean "physically primitive operations" on par with ontologically > primitive arrow of time. Isn't this like cracking open the axioms, and then > complaining that the building has cracks in it? > > > There are simply a pile of concepts that are just assumed without > explanation in any discussion of philosophy/logic/math. My point is that a > theory must be have the capacity of being communicable ab initio for it to > even be considered. When I am confronted with a theory or a "result" or an > argument that seems to disallow for communicability I am going to baulk at > it! > > And the possibility that you are baulking at your preconceptions rather than engaging the theory has never happened to you? Happens to me all the time. > > > > >> We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a >> Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. >> > > It's hard for me to see bets being made without some cash/investment/gap > of faith on the table. > > > Sure. > > Then it would be easy for you to directly address the question: why assume non-comp and then complain about comp's implications of time and physics arising from dream interaction of universal numbers, therefore being not primary or existing primitively? > > > >> In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the >> TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is >> that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in >> mythology, whether it is the >> Ptah<http://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.html>of ancient Egypt or the egg >> of Pangu <http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm> or whatever other myth >> one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and >> formal language of modal logic any different? >> >> > Nothing, at its base. Appearances and looks can deceive, as numbers can > too. > > > Would this not make that deception something in our understanding and > not the fault of numbers? After all, numbers are supposedly the least > ambiguous of entities! > > On the surface, but not when you look under the hood. That's a reductionist bias of number. > > > >> I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very >> suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. >> > > Same here. My point with humanism + natural sciences, including standard > model, is that you have to be straight about your wager: there's my magic > primitive right there, warts and all. > > Its deceiving to, on the one hand assert "no miracles" whatsoever, and > then ask for it at the instant of Big Bang. "Human" in this sense is both > deceptive through error and useful for power. > > > I think that we are too eager for explanations and are willing to play > fast and lose with concepts so long as we can hand wave problems away. > > Agreed. > > > >> (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing Fundamentalist" >> and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see >> things, any condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other >> conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either universal in >> that they apply anywhere and anytime or are such that there must be a >> particular configuration of events for them to occur. This principle (?) >> applies to everything, be it the Big Bang initial state/singularity or >> consciousness. >> >> One point about the Big Bang. It seems to me that if we are >> considering conditions in our current physical universe that involve >> sufficiently small scales and/or high enough energies that there should be >> the equivalent to the Big Bang initial conditions, thus the Big Bang should >> be considered as an ongoing process even now and not some epochally special >> event. >> > > You argue both comp ("universal, anywhere, eternal") and physically > primitive universe ("current physical universe", "ongoing process" etc). > > > It seems to me that we need both to come up with ontological theories! > I don't need to. Others are good at that. Every song I play/write is one ontological theory, that sometimes even kids can grasp and smile at. In ancient Greece, music was a branch of core education. Numbers and geometry were as important as an understanding of harmony. I am not idealizing ancient Greece, nor am I saying math = music. > > > That's why I ask above why you burn your money before you put it on the > (comp) table and claim the game is rigged? Just because "eternal is > foundation", doesn't imply that process isn't possible on some higher > level. Your alluding to mysticism points towards different ways you can > frame temporal and "atemporal" systems. There's not "a difference", there > are many, which is perhaps a fruitful avenue of inquiry. > > I do agree with you on the straight-jacket problem. But extreme limitation > is also liberating. > > > Freedom from is not freedom to. > I'm not saying UD is without problems or possible flaws; but simply fail to understand the flaw you are trying to express. Again: why burn the basement and complain the building has cracks? m > > > > Cowboy Obvious > > -- > > > > > > > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
