On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a concrete robust physical universe".


Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality.
In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.

Dear Bruno,

I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf>

"...what  if we  don't  grant a concrete robust  physical universe?"
"Actually the 8th present step will  explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham's razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ''matter'' has been ontologically reduced to ''mind'' where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental
machine psychology."

My claim is that _/*neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive*/_. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties.

[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds

Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp).

Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of multiple sheaves of computations?

[SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah <http://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.html> of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu <http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm> or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different?

I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter.

    That is not changed or involved by my argument.

[SPK] I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime

But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not primitive.

The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental theory". Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. Resources are required for computations to "run" so there has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do not have time to go into at this time...

My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define -> particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow -> particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither is ontologically primitive. Both emerge from a property neutral ground.




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