On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a
concrete robust physical universe".
?
Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I
explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality.
In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.
Dear Bruno,
I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you
still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf
"...what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical
universe?"
"Actually the 8th present step will explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make
the notion of concrete and
existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.
It will follow that a much
weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude
that not only physics has
been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but
that ‘‘matter’’ has been
ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the
object study of fundamental
machine psychology."
My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any
other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically
primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither
and has no particular properties.
How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic?
Dear Bruno,
No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be
complete and consistent simultaneously,
Why not? The One is not a theory.
thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed
to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality.
[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that
we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds
Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I
just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of
metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp).
Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable
aspects of multiple sheaves of computations?
This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp.
I agree.
[SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or
derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive -
Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow
in an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run
without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of
'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to
be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power
should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like
the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether
it is the Ptah of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever
other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in
the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any
different?
I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this
entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by
Solovay. All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G
and G*. There is no choice in the matter.
That is not changed or involved by my argument.
[SPK] I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'.
I am very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural
conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-
believing Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that
literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any
condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other
conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either
universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime
But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by
something more primitive, given that you agree that physics
cannot be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality
is not primitive.
The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time)
would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time
(or observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't
think that we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental
theory". Physics requires measurements/observations to be
meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p
and observer indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the
question of resources. Resources are required for computations to
"run" so there has to be the availability of resources involved in
*any* consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations
by only considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO.
You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects
(in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can
create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical
functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are
equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can
implement *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two
poles of a spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my
considerations that I do not have time to go into at this time...
My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define
-> particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states -
allow -> particular computations. They are mutually supervenient,
neither is ontologically primitive.
Comp is just the (theological) belief that I can survive with a
digital brain. The rest is logic.
I disagree, it is must more than that. It includes also the
belief that there is an "I"...
Both emerge from a property neutral ground.
I have no idea what you mean by this.
Read Russell. He is the one that convinced me of neutral monism.
I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the basic
object have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge from
it. You have to explain your point, not to refer to the literature.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
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