Hi Bruno Marchal  

As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same.
Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice,
his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. 

The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or 
platonia (same 1p, same identity), because
although its contents keep changing, it has 
to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme
monad would not know where to place the
constantly adjusted perceptions.

Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions
of each monad are not that of an individual soul such
as we understand perception. An individual soul
sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own
perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions
of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees
the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives.
The term "holographic perception" comes to mind. 

In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God
who knows all. 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 

On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: 

On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 

On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: 

On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 

[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a concrete robust 
physical universe".  


Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do 
assume a primitive physical reality.  
In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. 

Dear Bruno, 

       I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't 
understand... From: 

"...what  if we  don?  grant a concrete robust  physical  universe?"  
"Actually the 8th present step will  explain  
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of 
concrete and  
existing universe completely devoid of  any  explicative  power.  It  will  
follow  that  a  much  
weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that not only 
physics has  
been  epistemologically reduced  to  machine  psychology, but that  ?matter? 
has  been  
ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined  as the  object study of 
machine psychology." 

    My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object 
that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive. Both must emerge 
from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties.  

How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? 

 Dear Bruno, 

    No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and 
consistent simultaneously,  

Why not? The One is not a theory.  

thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed to have 
aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality.  

[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the 
very idea of the existence of physical worlds  

Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove 
this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a 
theorem in a theory (comp). 

    Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of 
multiple sheaves of computations? 

This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. 

    I agree. 

[SPK]  given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from 
irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, 
*} that are "operating" somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make 
the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 
'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run 
the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is 
that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in 
mythology, whether it is the Ptah of ancient Egypt or  the egg of Pangu or 
whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the 
sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? 

I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue 
of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose 
beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter. 

    That is not changed or involved by my argument. 

[SPK]     I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very 
suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'.  (This comes 
from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection 
of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or 
situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult 
condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere 
and anytime  

But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more 
primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory, 
given that the physical reality is not primitive. 

    The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) would seem 
to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements 
to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that "physics cannot 
be the fundamental theory". Physics requires measurements/observations to be 
meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer 
indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. 
Resources are required for computations to "run" so there has to be the 
availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. 
Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic 
objects is wrong, IMHO. 
    You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in 
Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can create physical 
objects that can implement (in their dynamical functions) instances of such, 
while I claim that computations are equivalence classes of functions that 
physical systems can implement *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as 
two poles of a spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I 
do not have time to go into at this time... 

    My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define -> 
particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow -> 
particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither is 
ontologically primitive.  

Comp is just the (theological) belief that I can survive with a digital brain. 
The rest is logic. 

    I disagree, it is must more than that. It includes also the belief that 
there is an "I"... 

Both emerge from a property neutral ground. 

I have no idea what you mean by this. 

    Read Russell. He is the one that convinced me of neutral monism. 

I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the basic object 
have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge from it. You have to 
explain your point, not to refer to the literature. 




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