Bruno, How has comp explained how there are Many Worlds? I presume you mean MWI and many physical worlds, not just many dream worlds.. Richard
On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > OK. > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 11/6/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-06, 07:21:19 > Subject: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory > > > On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions >> in the real world, > > ? > It does, but we are blas?. > > Let me give you example: > > 1) It predict that if I put two spoon of sugar in my tea, my tea will > have more sugar in it. > > 2) it predicts that some programs will not stop, and indeed we can > confirm this. > > 3) it predicts, together with string theory, that the mass of the > photon is zero. This uses the rather remarkable Ramanujan proposition > that the sum of all natural numbers 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is reasonably > equal to ... -1/12. So the apparant lack of mass of the photon > confirms this. > > 4) it predicts everything, with comp, although the math is hard to be > specific, but it has already explained why there is a quantization, > why there are many-worlds, and the whole of the theology of the L?ian > machines. This again is confirmed. of course here comp is used to make > arithmetic the theory of everything, and in that setting many problems > are open. > > > >> so it has not contingency about it, >> its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true. >> That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made >> (invented) and therefore contingent. >> >> Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not, > > You confuse a theory of arithmetic with the arithmetical truth. > > > >> arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori. > > Indeed. For arithmetical truth. But arithmetical theories have take > time to be isolated or human-invented. > > Bruno > > >> >> >> On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> >> All theories are based on the a priori but >> can only give contingent results (this world >> results). >> >> >> >> Hmm.... OK. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> However, arithmetic is not a theory, >> >> >> Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important >> one in the comp setting is the "very elementary theory". Basically >> just the four equalities: >> >> >> x+0 = x >> x+s(y) = s(x+y) >> >> >> x*0=0 >> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x >> >> >> This is already Turing universal. >> >> >> A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is >> the same four axioms + >> >> >> 0 ? s(x) >> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y >> >> >> and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical >> formula F(x) : >> >> >> ( F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x)) ) -> AxF(x) >> >> >> By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all* >> theories and machines. "Arithmetical Truth" cannot be defined by >> those machines, although they can build transfinite of >> approximation, and handles pointer on the notion. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> it is >> arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth. >> >> >> >> Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit >> and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than >> what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that >> it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from >> "inside". Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to >> (meta) laws, in the computer science setting. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 11/3/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33 >> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism >> >> >> >> >> On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: >> >> >> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> >> >> He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. >> >> >> People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a >> reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means. >> >> >> >> Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else. >> but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for >> the global conception of reality. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the >> brain. >> >> >> I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a >> great many other things too, >> >> >> Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle >> metaphysics. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before >> Evolution produced brains or "the owner [of a brain] itself must >> attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic". >> >> >> >> Let us go step by step. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> you are stuck in step 3 >> >> >> >> And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in >> step 3; >> >> >> Your "blunder" has been debunked by many people. Then you have >> oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1- >> views with 3-views. Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1- >> views on 1-views. >> You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after >> pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can >> happen, which is not a prediction. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that >> fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading. >> >> >> >> You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H >> >> >> Yes. >> >> >> >> by definition of comp. >> >> >> >> I don't know what that is. >> >> >> >> See above. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy. >> >> >> >> You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and >> mysterious about that? >> >> >> >> >> OK. Good. So you accept it. Please go to step 4 now, and tell me if >> you agree. We have all the time to see where the reasoning will >> eventually lead us. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my >> environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of >> philosophical interest in that fact . >> >> >> >> This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of >> predicting the weather is due to the deterministic chaos. This is >> not used in the first person indeterminacy. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any L?ian machine, >> >> >> >> Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a "L?ian >> machine" is. >> >> >> >> A universal machine capable of proving all sentence with the shape p >> -> Bew('p'), with p being an arithmetical sentence with shape >> ExP(x), and P decidable. Exemple: prover theorem for PA, ZF, etc. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary >> he sees Washington? 100%. >> >> >> >> >> The question was asked to the Helsinki man. >> >> >> >> >> But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a >> rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in >> his diary. >> >> >> >> >> The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have >> already accept that the guy itself survives. >> >> >> So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are >> asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed. >> >> >> No, the question is asked before he pushes on the read/cut button. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes the Helsinki man is also the Washington man so you could say >> there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I >> see Washington". >> >> >> No. the question is *about* a future 1-view. The guy knows that he >> might very well be the guy in Moscow, so he cannot assert that he >> will *feel* with 100% chance to be the one in Washington. Again you >> confuse the 3-view and the 1-view. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Of course the Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so there is a 100% >> chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I DO NOT see >> Washington". There is no contradiction because you have been >> duplicated. >> >> >> >> Of course there is no contradiction. But the Helsinki man would find >> to be contradict if he said I will find myself in W and I will find >> myself in Washington, from the first person view, as he knows that >> after pushing the button he will find himself being in only one >> city, not in two cities simultaneously. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and >> Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness >> has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened >> and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they >> will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal >> >> Exactly. This contradict what you say above though. >> >> >> I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any >> contradiction . >> >> >> >> You did it again. You pretend that there is 100% chance that he will >> feel to see Washington, and 100% chance he will feel to see Moscow, >> and yet you agree that there is 100% chance he will see only one >> city (and you forget that the question is which one, with what >> chance). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. >> >> >> >> >> Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7. >> >> >> Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does >> not work. >> >> >> >> ... for someone unable to understand that the question is about the >> future first person point of view, as seen by the future first >> person point of view, and not about the 3-view on all future first >> person points of view, as you keep giving. >> Reading step 4 should help you to eventually grasp this key nuance. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected] >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected] >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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