Bruno,

How has comp explained how there are Many Worlds?
I presume you mean MWI and many physical worlds, not just many dream worlds..
Richard

On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> OK.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 11/6/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-11-06, 07:21:19
> Subject: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory
>
>
> On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions
>> in the real world,
>
> ?
> It does, but we are blas?.
>
> Let me give you example:
>
> 1) It predict that if I put two spoon of sugar in my tea, my tea will
> have more sugar in it.
>
> 2) it predicts that some programs will not stop, and indeed we can
> confirm this.
>
> 3) it predicts, together with string theory, that the mass of the
> photon is zero. This uses the rather remarkable Ramanujan proposition
> that the sum of all natural numbers 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is reasonably
> equal to ... -1/12. So the apparant lack of mass of the photon
> confirms this.
>
> 4) it predicts everything, with comp, although the math is hard to be
> specific, but it has already explained why there is a quantization,
> why there are many-worlds, and the whole of the theology of the L?ian
> machines. This again is confirmed. of course here comp is used to make
> arithmetic the theory of everything, and in that setting many problems
> are open.
>
>
>
>> so it has not contingency about it,
>> its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true.
>> That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made
>> (invented) and therefore contingent.
>>
>> Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not,
>
> You confuse a theory of arithmetic with the arithmetical truth.
>
>
>
>> arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori.
>
> Indeed. For arithmetical truth. But arithmetical theories have take
> time to be isolated or human-invented.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>>
>>
>> On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>>
>> All theories are based on the a priori but
>> can only give contingent results (this world
>> results).
>>
>>
>>
>> Hmm.... OK.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> However, arithmetic is not a theory,
>>
>>
>> Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important
>> one in the comp setting is the "very elementary theory". Basically
>> just the four equalities:
>>
>>
>> x+0 = x
>> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>>
>>
>> x*0=0
>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>>
>>
>> This is already Turing universal.
>>
>>
>> A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is
>> the same four axioms +
>>
>>
>> 0 ? s(x)
>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
>>
>>
>> and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical
>> formula F(x) :
>>
>>
>> ( F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x)) ) -> AxF(x)
>>
>>
>> By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all*
>> theories and machines. "Arithmetical Truth" cannot be defined by
>> those machines, although they can build transfinite of
>> approximation, and handles pointer on the notion.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> it is
>> arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit
>> and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than
>> what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that
>> it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from
>> "inside". Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to
>> (meta) laws, in the computer science setting.
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 11/3/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33
>> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.
>>
>>
>> People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a
>> reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means.
>>
>>
>>
>> Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else.
>> but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for
>> the global conception of reality.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the
>> brain.
>>
>>
>> I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a
>> great many other things too,
>>
>>
>> Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle
>> metaphysics.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before
>> Evolution produced brains or "the owner [of a brain] itself must
>> attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".
>>
>>
>>
>> Let us go step by step.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> you are stuck in step 3
>>
>>
>>
>> And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in
>> step 3;
>>
>>
>> Your "blunder" has been debunked by many people. Then you have
>> oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1-
>> views with 3-views. Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1-
>> views on 1-views.
>> You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after
>> pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can
>> happen, which is not a prediction.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that
>> fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading.
>>
>>
>>
>> You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H
>>
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>
>>
>> by definition of comp.
>>
>>
>>
>> I don't know what that is.
>>
>>
>>
>> See above.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.
>>
>>
>>
>> You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and
>> mysterious about that?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> OK. Good. So you accept it. Please go to step 4 now, and tell me if
>> you agree. We have all the time to see where the reasoning will
>> eventually lead us.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my
>> environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of
>> philosophical interest in that fact .
>>
>>
>>
>> This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of
>> predicting the weather is due to the deterministic chaos. This is
>> not used in the first person indeterminacy.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any L?ian machine,
>>
>>
>>
>> Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a "L?ian
>> machine" is.
>>
>>
>>
>> A universal machine capable of proving all sentence with the shape p
>> -> Bew('p'), with p being an arithmetical sentence with shape
>> ExP(x), and P decidable. Exemple: prover theorem for PA, ZF, etc.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary
>> he sees Washington? 100%.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a
>> rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in
>> his diary.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have
>> already accept that the guy itself survives.
>>
>>
>> So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are
>> asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed.
>>
>>
>> No, the question is asked before he pushes on the read/cut button.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes the Helsinki man is also the Washington man so you could say
>> there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I
>> see Washington".
>>
>>
>> No. the question is *about* a future 1-view. The guy knows that he
>> might very well be the guy in Moscow, so he cannot assert that he
>> will *feel* with 100% chance to be the one in Washington. Again you
>> confuse the 3-view and the 1-view.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course the Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so there is a 100%
>> chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I DO NOT see
>> Washington". There is no contradiction because you have been
>> duplicated.
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course there is no contradiction. But the Helsinki man would find
>> to be contradict if he said I will find myself in W and I will find
>> myself in Washington, from the first person view, as he knows that
>> after pushing the button he will find himself being in only one
>> city, not in two cities simultaneously.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and
>> Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness
>> has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened
>> and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they
>> will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal
>>
>> Exactly. This contradict what you say above though.
>>
>>
>> I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any
>> contradiction .
>>
>>
>>
>> You did it again. You pretend that there is 100% chance that he will
>> feel to see Washington, and 100% chance he will feel to see Moscow,
>> and yet you agree that there is 100% chance he will see only one
>> city (and you forget that the question is which one, with what
>> chance).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7.
>>
>>
>> Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does
>> not work.
>>
>>
>>
>> ... for someone unable to understand that the question is about the
>> future first person point of view, as seen by the future first
>> person point of view, and not about the 3-view on all future first
>> person points of view, as you keep giving.
>> Reading step 4 should help you to eventually grasp this key nuance.
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
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>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
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