So comp does not explain MWI, it just explains many dreams On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 9:01 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 06 Nov 2012, at 15:02, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > How has comp explained how there are Many Worlds? > I presume you mean MWI and many physical worlds, not just many dream > worlds.. > > > > Once comp is assumed, it is easy to prove that all dreams exists in > arithmetic. But they obeys laws (relying on computer science or > arithmetic), and dreams can have coherent properties making them shared by > population of individuals, with reasonable relative proportions giving rise > to inferable "physical laws". > It is an open problem if this lead to "worlds", and in what sense. > If both comp and QM is correct, QM has to be derivable by only comp, and > some definition of knowledge. And up to now, this works well. But it is hard > (technically) to justify completely QM, and even harder to get the right > Hamiltonians, in case they are not purely geographical/contingent. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Richard > > On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > > OK. > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > > 11/6/2012 > > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > > From: Bruno Marchal > > Receiver: everything-list > > Time: 2012-11-06, 07:21:19 > > Subject: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory > > > > On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote: > > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > > IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions > > in the real world, > > > ? > > It does, but we are blas?. > > > Let me give you example: > > > 1) It predict that if I put two spoon of sugar in my tea, my tea will > > have more sugar in it. > > > 2) it predicts that some programs will not stop, and indeed we can > > confirm this. > > > 3) it predicts, together with string theory, that the mass of the > > photon is zero. This uses the rather remarkable Ramanujan proposition > > that the sum of all natural numbers 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is reasonably > > equal to ... -1/12. So the apparant lack of mass of the photon > > confirms this. > > > 4) it predicts everything, with comp, although the math is hard to be > > specific, but it has already explained why there is a quantization, > > why there are many-worlds, and the whole of the theology of the L?ian > > machines. This again is confirmed. of course here comp is used to make > > arithmetic the theory of everything, and in that setting many problems > > are open. > > > > > so it has not contingency about it, > > its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true. > > That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made > > (invented) and therefore contingent. > > > Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not, > > > You confuse a theory of arithmetic with the arithmetical truth. > > > > > arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori. > > > Indeed. For arithmetical truth. But arithmetical theories have take > > time to be isolated or human-invented. > > > Bruno > > > > > > On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote: > > > > Hi Bruno Marchal > > > > All theories are based on the a priori but > > can only give contingent results (this world > > results). > > > > > Hmm.... OK. > > > > > > > > > However, arithmetic is not a theory, > > > > Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important > > one in the comp setting is the "very elementary theory". Basically > > just the four equalities: > > > > x+0 = x > > x+s(y) = s(x+y) > > > > x*0=0 > > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > > > This is already Turing universal. > > > > A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is > > the same four axioms + > > > > 0 ? s(x) > > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y > > > > and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical > > formula F(x) : > > > > ( F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x)) ) -> AxF(x) > > > > By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all* > > theories and machines. "Arithmetical Truth" cannot be defined by > > those machines, although they can build transfinite of > > approximation, and handles pointer on the notion. > > > > > > > > > > it is > > arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth. > > > > > Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit > > and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than > > what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that > > it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from > > "inside". Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to > > (meta) laws, in the computer science setting. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > > 11/3/2012 > > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > > From: Bruno Marchal > > Receiver: everything-list > > Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33 > > Subject: Re: Against Mechanism > > > > > > On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: > > > > On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. > > > > People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a > > reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means. > > > > > Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else. > > but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for > > the global conception of reality. > > > > > > > > > Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the > > brain. > > > > I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a > > great many other things too, > > > > Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle > > metaphysics. > > > > > > > > things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before > > Evolution produced brains or "the owner [of a brain] itself must > > attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic". > > > > > Let us go step by step. > > > > > > > > > > > you are stuck in step 3 > > > > > And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in > > step 3; > > > > Your "blunder" has been debunked by many people. Then you have > > oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1- > > views with 3-views. Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1- > > views on 1-views. > > You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after > > pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can > > happen, which is not a prediction. > > > > > > > > > > after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that > > fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading. > > > > > You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p. > > > > > > > > > > > the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H > > > > Yes. > > > > > by definition of comp. > > > > > I don't know what that is. > > > > > See above. > > > > > > > > > > > This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy. > > > > > You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and > > mysterious about that? > > > > > > OK. Good. So you accept it. Please go to step 4 now, and tell me if > > you agree. We have all the time to see where the reasoning will > > eventually lead us. > > > > > > > > > > I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my > > environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of > > philosophical interest in that fact . > > > > > This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of > > predicting the weather is due to the deterministic chaos. This is > > not used in the first person indeterminacy. > > > > > > > > > > > And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any L?ian machine, > > > > > Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a "L?ian > > machine" is. > > > > > A universal machine capable of proving all sentence with the shape p > > -> Bew('p'), with p being an arithmetical sentence with shape > > ExP(x), and P decidable. Exemple: prover theorem for PA, ZF, etc. > > > > > > > > > > > > > What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary > > he sees Washington? 100%. > > > > > > The question was asked to the Helsinki man. > > > > > > But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a > > rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in > > his diary. > > > > > > The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have > > already accept that the guy itself survives. > > > > So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are > > asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed. > > > > No, the question is asked before he pushes on the read/cut button. > > > > > > > > > > Yes the Helsinki man is also the Washington man so you could say > > there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I > > see Washington". > > > > No. the question is *about* a future 1-view. The guy knows that he > > might very well be the guy in Moscow, so he cannot assert that he > > will *feel* with 100% chance to be the one in Washington. Again you > > confuse the 3-view and the 1-view. > > > > > > > > > > Of course the Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so there is a 100% > > chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I DO NOT see > > Washington". There is no contradiction because you have been > > duplicated. > > > > > Of course there is no contradiction. But the Helsinki man would find > > to be contradict if he said I will find myself in W and I will find > > myself in Washington, from the first person view, as he knows that > > after pushing the button he will find himself being in only one > > city, not in two cities simultaneously. > > > > > > > > > If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and > > Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness > > has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened > > and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they > > will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal > > > Exactly. This contradict what you say above though. > > > > I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any > > contradiction . > > > > > You did it again. You pretend that there is 100% chance that he will > > feel to see Washington, and 100% chance he will feel to see Moscow, > > and yet you agree that there is 100% chance he will see only one > > city (and you forget that the question is which one, with what > > chance). > > > > > > > > > > > It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. > > > > > > Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7. > > > > Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does > > not work. > > > > > ... for someone unable to understand that the question is about the > > future first person point of view, as seen by the future first > > person point of view, and not about the 3-view on all future first > > person points of view, as you keep giving. > > Reading step 4 should help you to eventually grasp this key nuance. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > > . > > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > > . > > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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