So comp does not explain MWI, it just explains many dreams

On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 9:01 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 06 Nov 2012, at 15:02, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>
> How has comp explained how there are Many Worlds?
> I presume you mean MWI and many physical worlds, not just many dream
> worlds..
>
>
>
> Once comp is assumed, it is easy to prove that all dreams exists in
> arithmetic.  But they obeys laws (relying on computer science or
> arithmetic), and dreams can have coherent properties making them shared by
> population of individuals, with reasonable relative proportions giving rise
> to inferable "physical laws".
> It is an open problem if this lead to "worlds", and in what sense.
> If both comp and QM is correct, QM has to be derivable by only comp, and
> some definition of knowledge. And up to now, this works well. But it is hard
> (technically) to justify completely QM, and even harder to get the right
> Hamiltonians, in case they are not purely geographical/contingent.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Richard
>
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>
> 11/6/2012
>
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>
> From: Bruno Marchal
>
> Receiver: everything-list
>
> Time: 2012-11-06, 07:21:19
>
> Subject: Re: why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory
>
>
>
> On 05 Nov 2012, at 13:19, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
> IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions
>
> in the real world,
>
>
> ?
>
> It does, but we are blas?.
>
>
> Let me give you example:
>
>
> 1) It predict that if I put two spoon of sugar in my tea, my tea will
>
> have more sugar in it.
>
>
> 2) it predicts that some programs will not stop, and indeed we can
>
> confirm this.
>
>
> 3) it predicts, together with string theory, that the mass of the
>
> photon is zero. This uses the rather remarkable Ramanujan proposition
>
> that the sum of all natural numbers 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+ ... is reasonably
>
> equal to ... -1/12. So the apparant lack of mass of the photon
>
> confirms this.
>
>
> 4) it predicts everything, with comp, although the math is hard to be
>
> specific, but it has already explained why there is a quantization,
>
> why there are many-worlds, and the whole of the theology of the L?ian
>
> machines. This again is confirmed. of course here comp is used to make
>
> arithmetic the theory of everything, and in that setting many problems
>
> are open.
>
>
>
>
> so it has not contingency about it,
>
> its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true.
>
> That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made
>
> (invented) and therefore contingent.
>
>
> Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not,
>
>
> You confuse a theory of arithmetic with the arithmetical truth.
>
>
>
>
> arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori.
>
>
> Indeed. For arithmetical truth. But arithmetical theories have take
>
> time to be isolated or human-invented.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
>
>
> All theories are based on the a priori but
>
> can only give contingent results (this world
>
> results).
>
>
>
>
> Hmm.... OK.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> However, arithmetic is not a theory,
>
>
>
> Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important
>
> one in the comp setting is the "very elementary theory". Basically
>
> just the four equalities:
>
>
>
> x+0 = x
>
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>
>
>
> x*0=0
>
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
>
>
> This is already Turing universal.
>
>
>
> A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is
>
> the same four axioms +
>
>
>
> 0 ? s(x)
>
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
>
>
>
> and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical
>
> formula F(x) :
>
>
>
> ( F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x)) ) -> AxF(x)
>
>
>
> By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all*
>
> theories and machines. "Arithmetical Truth" cannot be defined by
>
> those machines, although they can build transfinite of
>
> approximation, and handles pointer on the notion.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> it is
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> arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth.
>
>
>
>
> Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit
>
> and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than
>
> what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that
>
> it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from
>
> "inside". Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to
>
> (meta) laws, in the computer science setting.
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>
> 11/3/2012
>
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>
> From: Bruno Marchal
>
> Receiver: everything-list
>
> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33
>
> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism
>
>
>
>
>
> On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:
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>
>
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>
>
>
>
> He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.
>
>
>
> People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a
>
> reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means.
>
>
>
>
> Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else.
>
> but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for
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> the global conception of reality.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the
>
> brain.
>
>
>
> I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a
>
> great many other things too,
>
>
>
> Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle
>
> metaphysics.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before
>
> Evolution produced brains or "the owner [of a brain] itself must
>
> attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".
>
>
>
>
> Let us go step by step.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> you are stuck in step 3
>
>
>
>
> And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in
>
> step 3;
>
>
>
> Your "blunder" has been debunked by many people. Then you have
>
> oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1-
>
> views with 3-views. Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1-
>
> views on 1-views.
>
> You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after
>
> pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can
>
> happen, which is not a prediction.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that
>
> fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading.
>
>
>
>
> You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H
>
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>
> by definition of comp.
>
>
>
>
> I don't know what that is.
>
>
>
>
> See above.
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
>
> This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.
>
>
>
>
> You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and
>
> mysterious about that?
>
>
>
>
>
> OK. Good. So you accept it. Please go to step 4 now, and tell me if
>
> you agree. We have all the time to see where the reasoning will
>
> eventually lead us.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my
>
> environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of
>
> philosophical interest in that fact .
>
>
>
>
> This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of
>
> predicting the weather is due to the deterministic chaos. This is
>
> not used in the first person indeterminacy.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any L?ian machine,
>
>
>
>
> Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a "L?ian
>
> machine" is.
>
>
>
>
> A universal machine capable of proving all sentence with the shape p
>
> -> Bew('p'), with p being an arithmetical sentence with shape
>
> ExP(x), and P decidable. Exemple: prover theorem for PA, ZF, etc.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary
>
> he sees Washington? 100%.
>
>
>
>
>
> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.
>
>
>
>
>
> But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a
>
> rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in
>
> his diary.
>
>
>
>
>
> The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have
>
> already accept that the guy itself survives.
>
>
>
> So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are
>
> asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed.
>
>
>
> No, the question is asked before he pushes on the read/cut button.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Yes the Helsinki man is also the Washington man so you could say
>
> there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I
>
> see Washington".
>
>
>
> No. the question is *about* a future 1-view. The guy knows that he
>
> might very well be the guy in Moscow, so he cannot assert that he
>
> will *feel* with 100% chance to be the one in Washington. Again you
>
> confuse the 3-view and the 1-view.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Of course the Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so there is a 100%
>
> chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I DO NOT see
>
> Washington". There is no contradiction because you have been
>
> duplicated.
>
>
>
>
> Of course there is no contradiction. But the Helsinki man would find
>
> to be contradict if he said I will find myself in W and I will find
>
> myself in Washington, from the first person view, as he knows that
>
> after pushing the button he will find himself being in only one
>
> city, not in two cities simultaneously.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and
>
> Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness
>
> has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened
>
> and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they
>
> will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal
>
>
> Exactly. This contradict what you say above though.
>
>
>
> I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any
>
> contradiction .
>
>
>
>
> You did it again. You pretend that there is 100% chance that he will
>
> feel to see Washington, and 100% chance he will feel to see Moscow,
>
> and yet you agree that there is 100% chance he will see only one
>
> city (and you forget that the question is which one, with what
>
> chance).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not.
>
>
>
>
>
> Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7.
>
>
>
> Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does
>
> not work.
>
>
>
>
> ... for someone unable to understand that the question is about the
>
> future first person point of view, as seen by the future first
>
> person point of view, and not about the 3-view on all future first
>
> person points of view, as you keep giving.
>
> Reading step 4 should help you to eventually grasp this key nuance.
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
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