On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.

People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means.

Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else. but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for the global conception of reality.

> Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain.

I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a great many other things too,

Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle metaphysics.

things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains or "the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".

Let us go step by step.

> you are stuck in step 3

And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in step 3;

Your "blunder" has been debunked by many people. Then you have oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1- views with 3-views. Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1- views on 1-views. You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can happen, which is not a prediction.

after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading.

You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p.

 > the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H


> by definition of comp.

I don't know what that is.

See above.

> This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.

You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and mysterious about that?

OK. Good. So you accept it. Please go to step 4 now, and tell me if you agree. We have all the time to see where the reasoning will eventually lead us.

I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of philosophical interest in that fact .

This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of predicting the weather is due to the deterministic chaos. This is not used in the first person indeterminacy.

> And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any Löbian machine,

Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a "Löbian machine" is.

A universal machine capable of proving all sentence with the shape p - > Bew('p'), with p being an arithmetical sentence with shape ExP(x), and P decidable. Exemple: prover theorem for PA, ZF, etc.

>>>> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? 100%.

>>> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.

>> But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in his diary.

> The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have already accept that the guy itself survives.

So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed.

No, the question is asked before he pushes on the read/cut button.

Yes the Helsinki man is also the Washington man so you could say there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I see Washington".

No. the question is *about* a future 1-view. The guy knows that he might very well be the guy in Moscow, so he cannot assert that he will *feel* with 100% chance to be the one in Washington. Again you confuse the 3-view and the 1-view.

Of course the Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I DO NOT see Washington". There is no contradiction because you have been duplicated.

Of course there is no contradiction. But the Helsinki man would find to be contradict if he said I will find myself in W and I will find myself in Washington, from the first person view, as he knows that after pushing the button he will find himself being in only one city, not in two cities simultaneously.

>> If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal

> Exactly. This contradict what you say above though.

I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any contradiction .

You did it again. You pretend that there is 100% chance that he will feel to see Washington, and 100% chance he will feel to see Moscow, and yet you agree that there is 100% chance he will see only one city (and you forget that the question is which one, with what chance).

> It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not.

> Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7.

Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does not work.

... for someone unable to understand that the question is about the future first person point of view, as seen by the future first person point of view, and not about the 3-view on all future first person points of view, as you keep giving.
Reading step 4 should help you to eventually grasp this key nuance.



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