On 11 Nov 2012, at 02:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)
COMP -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.
But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.
The modal logics Z1*, X1*, and S4Grz1 generates an infinity of
experiences testing the logic of the observables. Those obtained have
been tested, as they corrresponds to orthomodularity, existence of a
quatization, etc. It is just an open problem if they can emulate a
quatum computer, as they should.
That's why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.
Yes, there is. the fact that you are indeterminate on an infinity of
computational histories, which can be relatively deep, making us
relatively rare and computationally costly, and yet mutiplied into
continuum of very simlar computations, given a notion of Gaussian
normality.
Of course it is only a beginning. But it has to work if comp + the
classical theory of knoweldge are correct, and it is the only theory
which separates naturally the quanta as particular qualia, and give an
arithmetical interpretation for the mystical conception of reality
(Plato, Plotinus).
Bruno
Brent
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