On 11/10/2012 8:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
COMP -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.
But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
This is the same idea that I have been trying to address with
Bruno. He does not seem to notice that without a means to define a 3p
localizability that there is no way for minds to distinguish themselves
from each other. This leads, it seems to me, to a solipsism situation
for a mind.
Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness.
But is Loebianity necessary for the ability of a consciousness to
know that it is conscious or is it necesary just to be conscious w/o
knowning that it is? I am ignoring considerations of reportability for
I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more restricted.
Does Bruno agree with panprotopsychism?
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