On 11 Nov 2012, at 20:46, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/10/2012 8:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.
But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.  That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.
Dear Russell,

This is the same idea that I have been trying to address with Bruno. He does not seem to notice that without a means to define a 3p localizability that there is no way for minds to distinguish themselves from each other.


That's part of the body problem, which admits a precise mathematical formulation derivable from comp.



This leads, it seems to me, to a solipsism situation for a mind.

This cannot been excluded, but then comp is made very plausibly false, as it is a non solipsism at the start, given that it attributes different minds to an infinity of different relative numbers.






Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness.

But is Loebianity necessary for the ability of a consciousness to know that it is conscious

Possible.




or is it necesary just to be conscious w/o knowning that it is? I am ignoring considerations of reportability for now...

I tend to think that a planaria is conscious, but not self-conscious, contrary to jumping spiders, octopi and all vertebrates and other Löbian entities.





 I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more restricted.

   Does Bruno agree with panprotopsychism?

No. Only person, in a larger sense than human person of course, are conscious, and they all necessitate a computer or relative universal number.

Comp makes panprotopsychism even undefined, as "pan" is very ambiguous. Does it means all numbers, or all physical objects, or all mental objects?

With comp, only person supported by universal relations can think and can be conscious.

Bruno






--
Onward!

Stephen


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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