On Friday, November 23, 2012 4:23:49 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
>  Hi Bruno Marchal 
>  
> 1) I suspect that when you refer to imagination, it is the
> same as what I call intuition.  They're related, but I don't 
> think they're exactly the same. I see intuition as coming
> from Platonia and spreading wider than the individual to
> all possible solutions. In essence, you do not imagine these
> solutions, they become evident to you.
>

Imagination and intuition are different.

Imagine a blue chair. Works right?

Have an intuition that someone is going to ring your doorbell. Didn't work, 
did it? You can't make yourself have an intuition, intuition comes to you 
unbidden from beyond your conscious attention. Imagination produces results 
in the form of images and other ideal gestalts, both voluntarily and 
involuntarily, just as we can choose to control our breathing to some 
extent or allow it to happen outside of our conscious attention.

 
> 2) Maybe I misundertand you, but I especially don't see how the machine,  
> has any advantage over the person with regard to 1p. As I see it,
> 1p is a blind spot, machine or person. Godel holds for both a
> person and a machine. 
>  
>

1p is only a blind spot from a 3p perspective. Everything that has every 
been experienced is only 1p as far as we know. This is actually one of the 
main points where my model improves the conventional understanding. Neither 
1p nor 3p can be proved against the other. The more relevant dichotomy is 
between spatially extended public exterior sense and temporally intended 
private interior sense. Both are really 1p, but the former faces a 3p which 
may or may not be primitively 'real'.

Craig
 

>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ndHHgRGYXZ0J.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to