Hi Roger,
On 23 Nov 2012, at 10:23, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
1) I suspect that when you refer to imagination, it is the
same as what I call intuition. They're related, but I don't
think they're exactly the same. I see intuition as coming
from Platonia and spreading wider than the individual to
all possible solutions. In essence, you do not imagine these
solutions, they become evident to you.
OK. "intuition" and imagination" are fuzzy word capable of having
different meaning according to the context.
I would say that I agree with you here, but this does not mean much.
2) Maybe I misundertand you, but I especially don't see how the
machine,
has any advantage over the person with regard to 1p. As I see it,
1p is a blind spot, machine or person.
Usually the 1p is rather transparent, from the 1p point of view (pov).
Not sure to get what you mean here.
Godel holds for both a
person and a machine.
That's the point. So you agree with me that Penrose and Lucas are
wrong on this, as they believe that Gödel applies to machines, but not
to humans, making us superior or at least different from machines. On
the contrary I consider Gödel's theorem as the first non trivial exact
proposition for the ideally sound human. The first theorem in "exact
psychology", or "theology". This makes sense with the comp hypothesis.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [[email protected]]
11/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-21, 12:26:21
Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett
Interpretation
On 21 Nov 2012, at 14:10, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the
subject cannot be part of the predicate ?
Yes. the subject (1p) can't. But the machine can still refer to
itself.
Then in any system
there will always be at least one subject, and that subject
cannot be part of the rest of the system ?
Eve,ntually the "system" belongs only to the imagination of the
subject.
Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that
in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one
supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul
cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.
Possible. the universal knower in ourself might then be the "supreme
monad". But it is not the outer God, it more the universal soul, the
third greek god.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [[email protected]]
11/21/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31
Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett
Interpretation
On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,
I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities'
that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even
particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.
I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux
I point
out in my book.
Hi Russell,
And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming
that we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact
of a particular basis that some set of "observers with
compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality
something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking
but I'll put that aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered
about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's
catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is
being assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something
that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-
Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very
much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic
as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems
to disallow for such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)
Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although
"objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual
infinities (at least in some sense).
Dear Bruno,
OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted
within comp's theoretical structure.
You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the
reasoning of the L bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the
non L bian reality (RA or the UD).
I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I'
that is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a
human or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can
somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It is
the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the
idea that some memories that can only be defined with reference
to physical bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not
much different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M.
does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object
and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind
of substance that has persistent existence, like material
substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this
assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of
mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are
altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a
'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has
no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get
Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine
atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)
Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?
I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this
time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for
some thought on your part.
From:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams
"A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is
a number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers.
The first coordinate is called the head, and the second the tail.
The tail of a given stream might be different from it, but again,
it might be the very same stream. For example, consider the stream
s whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail of the
tail of s is s itself. We have s = 0, s , s = 0,
0, s , etc. This stream s exhibits object circularity.
It is natural to “unravel” its definition as:
(0,0,…,0,…)
It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an infinite
sequence; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions
whose domain is the set N of natural numbers. So we can take the
unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether
we want to take the stream s described above to be this function
is an issue we want to explore in a general way in this entry.
Notice that since we defined s to be an ordered pair, it follows
from the way pairs are constructed in ordinary mathematics that s
will not itself be the constant sequence 0."
A Quine atom is a set that only has itself as a member or
"Quine Atom is a set Q that satisfies Q={Q}".
see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine_atom and
http://math.eretrandre.org/mybb/showthread.php?tid=28
It might be helpful to think of a Quine atom as a labeled
transition system to understand my point about the relation
between Quine atoms and streams.
OK. All this is really a matter of implementation or
representation. The second recursion theorem handles this well
enough for computer science, but it is OK to choose any other
system, if you prefer. But then you have to redo a big part of the
work already done.
Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs
including all streams.
Yes. This is why I think that your UD idea is very important!
And the UD, and all the finite section of its work exist in
arithmetic. The gluing of those dreams is not, and belongs to the
first person experience of the machines, which is independent of
the UD-time-steps, so that it looks, and is mathematically
described by the union of those finite pieces, and that lead to
complex analytical structure of their stable realities.
Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent
of bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just
an obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the
existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's
argument, something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and
thus are left with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res
extensa' used to be?
But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to
speculate on a flaw in step 8, to get this.
Why? I am only taking comp seriously and considering that a
finite but very large plurality of L bian entities can form a
defacto 'physical world' by their mutual agreements or truths.
How will you select that finite set from the set of all L bian
machines, or L bian machines experiences?
This 'physical world' is not to be considered as ontological
primitive!
I still have no clue of what is your theory, by which I mean your
primitive element.
And I am at loss when you argue that the primitive elements have no
properties, as I can't see how anything might emerge from that.
I thought for a long time on this list that the step 8 was not
needed here, as the postulation of a small primitive physical
universe cut the benefits of everything-like philosophy, which
was the starting of this very list.
Yes, so why is my idea so difficult for you to grok?
Well, because, now, you seem to invoke a finite set, when the
everything idea suggests an infinite one.
I grok just when you say that something is not correct in my work
or post, and fail to say something understandable about that. For
most of your posts I thought that you are coherent with comp, but
then you still invoke the physical reality to oppose comp
immaterialism, and this despite you do agree that the physical
reality is not primitive. This does not make a lot of sense.
Also, to be "left with the body problem" is what is intersting in
comp, as it gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and
be explained. All the other theories assumed matter at the start.
I know and this is what I wish to overcome, but I which for a
model of interactions between L bian entities.
I wish for many things, I wish for deriving the whole of physics
from arithmetic. My work shows only that the unique way to solve
the mind-body problem, once assuming comp, and keeping qualia and
quanta distinct, consists in defining knowledge and observation
from the self-reference logics, and that the whole physics has to
emerge from that, as I did completely illustrate already at the
physical propositional level.
I know that such a work might seems frustrating for a philosopher,
as it shows how with comp, the questions are translated into
arithmetic, and that the solutions might take time to be found,
despite somehow the main definitions and theorems already exist (cf
G del, L b, Solovay, Visser, G and G*).
I thought mathematicians and philosophers would be very pleased by
such a bridge, but I have learned to be more realist about this,
since. Many people in universities fight for defending the
curriculum statu quo, instead of ideas and theories.
This makes me think that the continental philosophy curriculum, and
perhaps a part of the anglo-saxon one, might someday fall like
Berlin wall, but it will take some time, to say the least.
The fuzziness of the human science is too much an advantage for the
politics and the manipulations. This strikes the eyes when you
study the detail of the cannabis scandal, but is obviously clear in
most religious or atheist institutions.
Bruno
Bruno
I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of
all
possible observers.
Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is
necessary for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of
it backwards; could you consider that there is a difference
between being able to 'know' that one is conscious and simply
being conscious? I think that Craig is making the case that
'sense' or raw 'something that is like being in the world' is
not separable from the 'being in the world'. What we have is the
case where the 'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself;
yet this wording does violence to the concept that I have been
trying to explain.
The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and
Zuckerman & Miranker's Russell operator idea and the
Quine atom as a formal mathematical concept and its
identification of the object with itself. It cannot be
understood so long as one is embedded in the vision of the
universe as being well founded and 'regular' - that there are a
single set of 'irreducible' parts that make it up. It amazes me
that the ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 years ago still
carry so much influence over our thinking!
--
Onward!
Stephen
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