On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, ...

Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict comp, which is assumed also.
Dear Bruno,

Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each other as a 'physical reality"?

There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.




I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?

? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.

Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult, but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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